Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens by Johnson, Kevin R.
Why Alienage Jurisdiction?
Historical Foundations and Modern
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction
Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens
Kevin R. Johnsont
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 2
II. THE ORIGINS ............................................... 6
A. The Constitutional Convention and Ratification ......................... 6
1. Historical Context ....................................... 6
2. Debate over the Alienage Provisions of Article III .................. 10
3. Unanswered Questions ................................... 16
B. The First Congress ......................................... 17
C. Summary ................................................ 20
III. THE EVOLUTION ............................................. 20
A. Congressional Tinkering ....................................... 21
1. Limitations on Diversity Jurisdiction ........................... 21
a. The Citizenship Provisions ............................. 21
b. The Amount in Controversy Requirement ..................... 23
2. Lawful Permanent Residents as State Citizens .................... 24
B. Judicial Gloss ............................................ 29
IV. MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS ........................................ 30
A. The Conventional Wisdom ...................................... 31
B. A Typology of Noncitizens: A Continuum of Bias? ..................... 32
C. Recurring Xenophobia in the United States ........................... 35
D. Alienage Jurisdiction and International Trade ......................... 43
1. Domestic Anxiety over Foreign Capital ........................ 43
2. The Commercial Benefits of Alienage Jurisdiction................... 46
E. The Advantages of a Federal Over a State Forum ..................... 49
F. Summary ................................................ 52
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ........................................ 52
A. The Over- and Underinclusiveness of Alienage Jurisdiction ................ 52
B. Specific Changes .......................................... 56
1. A Separate Alienage Statute ................................ 56
2. Minimal Diversity in Alienage Cases ........................... 57
3. Reconsideration of the Citizenship Rules for Foreign Corporations ........ 59
4. Reconsideration of the Amount in Controversy Requirements ........... 60
t Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; J.D. 1983, Harvard University; A.B. 1980,
University of California at Berkeley.
Thanks to Vikram David Amar, Pat Borchers, Alan Brownstein, Minty Siu Chung, Kevin Clermont,
Wythe Holt, Clyde Jacobs, Lash LaRue, Hiroshi Motomura, Deborah Ramirez, and Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez. Each read a draft of this Article and offered numerous insights and criticisms. Gerald Neuman
directed me to materials on mixed juries. The excellent work of a dedicated group of research assistants,
Gina Sirianni, E. Dion Costa, and Aleem Ullah Khan Raja, is greatly appreciated. Research support from
UC MEXUS (The University of California Institute for Mexico and the United States), the U.C. Davis
Academic Senate, and the Dean's Office of the U.C. Davis School of Law made this Article possible.
2 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 1
5. Elimination of the Provision Deeming Certain Lawful Permanent Residents to
be Citizens of a State .................................... 61
6. Limiting Alienage Jurisdiction ............................... 62
C. Possible Objections ........................................ 63
D. Alternatives for Study ......................................... 64
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................... 66
I. INTRODUCTION
Burgeoning international trade' and high levels of migration between
nations2 demonstrate concretely how technological improvements have made
the world a smaller place. One might expect growing global interdependence
almost inevitably to result in the increase of legal disputes between U.S. and
foreign citizens and businesses.3 At the same time, there is every reason to
worry about whether foreigners can obtain an impartial resolution of these
disputes in the United States. Xenophobia, long a staple of American society,
might be expected to influence the litigation of such disputes.
Over two centuries ago, the Framers of the Constitution attempted to
calm similar fears by providing that the national courts could exercise alienage
jurisdiction over disputes between citizens and aliens.4 Article III of the
Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."' Implementing this constitutional authorization
1. See JOHN H. JACKSON & iILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 8-10 (2d ed. 1986).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 16 (1994) (showing general increase in number of immigrants admitted to
United States since 1950).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6604-05 (stating that impetus for passage of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was that "American
citizens are increasingly coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states" and
offering examples of increasing commerce between U.S. and foreign states); JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 20 (1995) (noting increasingly transnational nature of
mass tort cases).
4. For a variety of reasons that I have described elsewhere, I find the term "alien" as used to refer
to noncitizens to be unsatisfactory. See Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's
Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 281 n.5. Others have made similar observations. See, e.g.,
Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1983) (characterizing term "illegal alien" used in
closing argument as "incendiary, derogatory expression" that justified new trial because it "appeal[ed] to
the prejudice and bias of members of the jury"); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government
Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428
(1995) (recognizing that reference to "noncitizens as aliens ... calls attention to their 'otherness,' and
even associates them with nonhuman invaders from outer space"). The alienage jurisdiction terminology
is, in my view, similarly problematic. However, because this shorthand has long been the rule in the
federal courts literature, I feel compelled to employ it in this Article.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This language makes it clear that Article III, apart from alienage
jurisdiction, allows for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over cases and controversies involving foreign
states. Congress has implemented the constitutional authorization with respect to suits against states in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1331, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). See, e.g.,
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607
(1992); see also Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV.
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in broad fashion, the First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 bestowed
upon the federal courts jurisdiction over
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and.. . an alien is a party,
or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another State.'
Thus, from the earliest days of the republic, Congress authorized the federal
courts to hear alienage cases. That, combined with the fact that Congress did
not bestow federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts until 1875,1
suggests that the leaders of the. young nation attached special importance to
alienage jurisdiction.8
Alienage jurisdiction traditionally has been lumped together with Article
III's grant of diversity jurisdiction, which permits the federal courts to hear
disputes between citizens of different states. The debates at the Constitutional
Convention between Federalists and Antifederalists about the federal courts9
shed little light on precisely why the Framers included the diversity provisions
of Article III.0 This has spawned a debate spanning over two centuries about
385 (1982) (analyzing process of bringing suit against foreign states under Act). Congress also has
authorized federal jurisdiction over actions brought by foreign states as plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(4) (1988). Federal jurisdiction over suits involving foreign nations is beyond the scope of this
Article.
6. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (partially codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The classic study of the Judiciary Act is Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923). For a critique, see WILFRED J. RITZ,
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JuDIcIARY AcT OF 1789 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990).
Congress has amended the statute on numerous occasions. See infra Part III.A (tracing evolution of
alienage provisions of diversity statute). The general diversity statute currently provides that, when the
amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs, the federal courts have jurisdiction
over cases between:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional
parties;
(4) and.., a foreign state.., as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(4) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
7. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875 § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953) (analyzing federal question jurisdiction
of federal courts).
8. See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 548
(1989) (proclaiming that alienage jurisdiction was "single most important grant of national court
jurisdiction embodied in the [Judiciary] Act"). But cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article ll's
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447,
509 n.296 (1994) (disputing Professor Holt's contention that diversity and alienage jurisdiction were of
special significance to Framers).
9. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 1H.- Separating the Two 7ters
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985) (interpreting Article III by focusing on federalism
and separation of powers principles); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise
of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEx. L. REv. 79 (1993) (examining
political process of drafting Constitution). For an analysis of the evolving political ideology during this
era, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
10. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3601,
at 337 (2d ed. 1984); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 3, 3 (1948).
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the Framers' underlying rationale for diversity jurisdiction. 11
It is somewhat surprising that, despite the academic preoccupation with
diversity jurisdiction, precious little attention has been paid to its first cousin,
alienage jurisdiction, which the Framers and the First Congress believed to
be so important." Some of the most well known writings on federal
jurisdiction virtually ignore it. 3 This is true even though alienage
jurisdiction, unlike diversity, implicates controversial issues such as foreign
relations, international trade, and xenophobia. When the topic of alienage
jurisdiction is broached, a common assumption is that the underlying
rationales for alienage and diversity jurisdiction are identical. Careful study,
including "rattling through dusty attics of" the history books,1 4 however,
reveals that alienage jurisdiction differs in salient respects from ordinary
diversity jurisdiction.
The longstanding treatment of alienage and diversity jurisdiction as
interchangeable has not been without costs. In response to the much publicized
"litigation explosion,""5 the last several decades have seen myriad proposals
to limit federal jurisdiction, including the perennial call to abolish or greatly
restrict diversity jurisdiction. 6 In response, Congress has incrementally
pruned diversity (and, indirectly, alienage) jurisdiction, most notably by
increasing the amount in controversy requirement fivefold from $10,000 to
$50,000 in 1988 and, oddly enough, by proclaiming one category of
noncitizens to be state citizens.1
7
Efforts to reduce the diversity caseload of the federal courts have
indirectly narrowed the scope of alienage jurisdiction, generally with precious
little, if any, thought. 18 This is true even though alienage cases constitute a
relatively small proportion of the total number of diversity cases and little
stands to be gained in terms of docket reduction. 9 Many who advocate
11. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 142 (1994) ("It might be
thought that the historical origins ofajurisdiction that has been employed steadily for almost two centuries
would be a subject of interest only to antiquarians. With regard to diversity, however, time has only
exacerbated the controversy stirred at the time of the ratification debates.").
12. A notable exception is Holt, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1994); CHARLES
T. MCCORMICK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (9th ed. 1992); WRIGHT, supra
note 11.
14. Chauffeurs, Teamsters &Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 575 (1990) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
15. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-166 (1985);
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTTEE 4-10 (1990); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry
Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 67 ("If there is one thing
about which practically all federal judges agree, it is that their dockets are overcrowded. This belief
appears well-founded.").
16. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3601, at 344-63 (summarizing debate about
diversity's abolition); POSNER, supra note 15, at 139-47 (same).
17. See infra Part III.A (analyzing amendments to diversity statute impacting alienage cases).
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. From 1991 to 1993, of the over 200,000 cases filed annually in the district courts, about 50,000
were diversity of citizenship, including alienage, cases. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS 1993, at 8 (1994). Although the Annual Reports do not contain information on
the number of alienage cases falling within the diversity category, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Analysis and Reports Branch, Statistics Division compiles such information from Civil
Cover Sheets submitted with complaints filed in the district courts. From statistical summary information
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abolition of diversity support the retention of alienage jurisdiction,20 though
some argue for a substantial reduction in its scope.2' Indeed, a subcommittee
report of the blue ribbon Federal Courts Study Committee suggested that
alienage jurisdiction was not one of the most essential forms of federal
jurisdiction.' Proposals to restrict alienage jurisdiction generally fail to
analyze thoroughly the independent rationales for such jurisdiction, especially
the possible foreign relations and trade consequences should aliens be
perceived as having been treated unfairly by the state courts.
The indirect incursions on alienage jurisdiction would not be troubling if
Congress, upon reflection, were to conclude that such jurisdiction was no
longer necessary. In times of crowded dockets, it is certainly worth
considering whether alienage jurisdiction may be restricted or eliminated
without serious adverse consequences. The problem, however, is that
Congress, in narrowing diversity, has for the most part failed to consider the
potential impact on alienage cases and whether alienage jurisdiction, separate
and apart from diversity, is worth keeping.
This Article contends that alienage and diversity jurisdiction should be
treated as analytically distinct. By so doing, it is more likely that alienage
jurisdiction will remain faithful to its historical roots. In addition, separate
treatment will tend to ensure that the modern justifications for alienage
jurisdiction are best served.
Part II of this Article analyzes the historical foundations for alienage
jurisdiction, specifically the context in which the Framers of the Constitution
and members of the First Congress provided for alienage jurisdiction. Part Ill
traces how Congress has implemented Article HI's alienage provisions and
how the Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant statutory enactments. Part
IV considers whether Congress should maintain alienage jurisdiction in the
face of the general calls to limit federal jurisdiction. Part V concludes by
offering some thoughts on the need to improve the operation of alienage
jurisdiction, makes specific recommendations for congressional reform, and
identifies a few avenues for future exploration. Congress coild greatly
improve alienage jurisdiction if it simply enacted an alienage statute separate
and apart from the general diversity statute.
provided by Maurice S. Galloway of that division, which is on file with the author, for the fiscal year that
ended on March 30, 1994, 3948 of the 53,737 diversity cases (about 7.3%) had a citizen or subject of a
foreign country or a foreign state itself as a party. If only foreign citizens or subjects are counted, alienage
cases account for 6.5% (3496 of 53,737) of the total diversity caseload. Foreign citizens or subjects
brought about 35% (1383 of 3948) of the total alien cases (and about 39.6% (1383 of 3496) of those
alienage cases only involving foreign citizens or subjects, not foreign states), or about 2.6% (1383 of the
53,737) of the total number of diversity cases.
20. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 38;
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 29-32 (2d prtg.
1995); HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 149-50 (1973); Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 963, 966-68 (1979).
21. See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 121-23 (suggesting
numerous limitations on alienage jurisdiction).
22. See REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
STATES 130-32 (1990), in I FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (1990) [hereinafter FCSC, WORKING PAPERS] (explaining why subcommittee
considered alienage jurisdiction to be outside "minimum federal jurisdiction").
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Il. THE ORIGINS
To place the adoption of alienage jurisdiction in historical context, I will
briefly look at the developments culminating in the Constitutional Convention,
which offer some clues about why there was a near consensus among the
Framers on the need for alienage jurisdiction. The Framers and Congress, in
passing the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not devote much time to debating the
decision to allow the federal courts to hear alienage cases. This should not be
surprising. During the reign of the Articles of Confederation, state courts and
legislatures, arguably in violation of the Treaty of Paris ending the
Revolutionary War, made it difficult for British creditors to collect debts from
local debtors. By providing for alienage jurisdiction in the national courts, the
Framers acted to avoid the potentially adverse foreign relations consequences
caused by allowing state courts, fueled by a mixture of anti-British and
anticreditor sentiment, to resolve disputes involving noncitizens. Instead, the
Framers ensured that foreigners had access to a national court system
perceived as less susceptible to the democratic impulse than the state
courts.' Many, particularly the Federalists, hoped that alienage jurisdiction
would attract much needed foreign capital to the fledgling nation. In essence,
alienage jurisdiction reflected many of the same concerns in the United States
that influenced the call for a strong national government.
A. The Constitutional Convention and Ratification
1. Historical Context
Anti-British sentiment, commonplace during the colonial period, grew in
intensity as the American Revolution neared.24 The bloodiness of the war and
the hatred of the British by many Americans cannot be understated.' During
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("State
judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be
relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTrrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 883, at 629-30 (1833) (noting difference between tenure of
federal and state judges and opining that diversity jurisdiction would promote extension of credit due to
availability of "prompt, efficient, and impartial administration of enforcing contracts"). One observer,
however, has emphasized that:
[t]he same biased jurors serve in both state and federal courts, and the power of a federal
judge to protect an out-of-stater by directing a verdict or by setting one aside is not great. The
argument for diversity jurisdiction must therefore be that the federal judge will more freely
exercise the powers that he has - assuming, as will not always be the case, that the federal
judge is less biased than his state court counterpart.
Kramer, supra note 21, at 120; see FRIENDLY, supra note 20, at 149 (arguing that costs outweigh marginal
benefits of this rationale for diversity jurisdiction).
24. See CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743-1776, at 117-18,
135-36, 305-14, 332-34 (1955); Holt, supra note 8, at 553-62; see also Richard Maxwell Brown, Violence
and the American Revolution, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James
H. Hutson eds., 1973) (describing violent protest of British policies culminating in Revolution).
25. In James Madison's words:
No description can give you an adequate idea of the barbarity with which the enemy have
conducted the war in the Southern States. Every outrage which humanity could suffer has been
committed by them. Desolation rather than conquest seems to have been their object. They
have acted more like desperate bands of robbers or buccaneers than like a nation making war
[Vol. 21: 1
and after the war, Americans subjected some loyalists to brutal violence.
26
A distinctly anti-British attitude pervaded U.S. society in the tumultuous years
immediately following the war.2
Economic factors, which some claim were the root cause of the
Revolution, fueled antagonism toward the British in the post-war period.28
The states often failed to enforce debts owed by their citizens to British
creditors. This problem grew as the U.S. economy experienced fluctuations
and readjustments caused by, among other factors, the loss of British financial
support. Local debtors faced difficult times repaying their obligations.29 Debt
collection through the courts was extremely difficult, and debtor insurrections
sought to close the state courts to collection proceedings." A famous
example is Shays' Rebellion in western Massachusetts in 1786.21 State
legislatures also passed a number of debtor relief laws. 2 In sum, British
creditors found debt collection in the United States under the Articles of
Confederation to be less than ideal.33 For example, "[t]here can be no
doubt . . . of direct bias in the administration of justice against British
creditors in Virginia.""
for dominion. Negroes, horses, tobacco, &c., not the standards and arms of their antagonists,
are the trophies which display their success. Rapes, murders, and the whole catalogue of
individual cruelties, not protection and the distribution of justice, are the acts which
characterize the sphere of their usurped jurisdiction.
Letter from James Madison to Philip Mazzei (July 7, 1781), in I LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGs OF
JAMES MADISON 49 (1867).
26. See ALAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION,
1775-1789, at 268-74 (1924) (describing violence against loyalists in New York).
27. See id. (discussing events after Revolution, including British encouragement of aggression by
Indian tribes against United States and discrimination against U.S. commerce, exacerbating domestic
antipathy toward British).
28. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3-23 (1972).
See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1939) (analyzing economic influences on framing of Constitution).
29. See Holt, supra note 8, at 558-59 (discussing inability of many debtors, particularly Southern
planters and farmers, to pay debts as a result of economic downturn).
30. See id. at 553-62.
31. See WOOD, supra note 9, at 412-13 (observing influence of Shays' Rebellion on call for
constitutional reform).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 61-70 (analyzing Framers' observations on subject). To that
end, state legislatures at times exercised quasi-judicial powers that benefited debtors at the expense of
creditors. See WOOD, supra note 9, at 408-09; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447,
1453 (1995) (discussing how "vigorous, indeed often radical, populism of the revolutionary legislatures
and assemblies, increased the frequency of legislative correction of judgments" resulting in Framers'
adherence to strict separation of powers principles) (citations omitted).
33. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice 7 Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1430-53.
34. Frank, supra note 10, at 24 (footnotes omitted). The state courts more generally exhibited
antiforeign sentiments. See Holt, supra note 33, at 1427-30.
Max Farrand recounts a story that circulated during this period of events in the Virginia legislature.
This story illustrates the sensitivity over the issue of debt collection by British creditors:
A Scotchman, John Warden, a prominent lawyer and good classical scholar, but suspected
rightly of Tory leanings during the Revolution, learning of the large minority against the
repeal of laws in conflict with the treaty of 1783 (i.e., especially the laws as to the collection
of debts by foreigners), caustically remarked that some of the members of the House had voted
against paying for the coats on their backs. The story goes that he was summoned before the
House in full session, and was compelled to beg their pardon on his knees, but as he rose,
pretending to brush the dust from his knees, he pointed to the House and said audibly, with
evident double meaning, "Upon my word, a dommed dirty house it is indeed." The Journal
Alienage Jurisdiction1996]
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The difficulties that the British faced in debt collection proved to be a
nagging problem for the national government. In the Treaty of Paris of 1783,
the United States agreed not to impose legal impediments to the recovery of
private debts by British creditors." As the previously described actions
suggest, the states refused to abide by this treaty obligation. 6 This typified
more general problems with the conduct of foreign relations by the national
government under the Articles of Confederation. Some states, in pursuit of
their own foreign policy agendas, disregarded treaties entered into by the
national government.37 These developments, in combination with many
others, precipitated the calling of the Constitutional Convention.38
Debt collection raised economic issues of more general concern to the
nation. A fear existed, particularly strong among the Federalists, that the
nation would be unable to attract much needed capital absent easier
enforcement of commercial obligations owed to foreign citizens by U.S.
citizens. A national court system was considered one solution.39
The idea that procedural devices might protect foreigners and facilitate
commerce found historical precedent in an ancient English legal practice.
Trials de medietate linguae, literally "trials 'of the half tongue,' [were] trials
in which one party was an alien whose native language was not English."4"
Such trials would be conducted before a jury with one half the jury composed
of noncitizens and one half citizens. 4 Originating in the early 1200s in
of the House, however, shows that the honor of the delegates was satisfied by a written
assurance from Mr. Warden that he meant in no way to affront the dignity of the House or
to insult any of its members.
MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 46 n.1 (1913) (citation
omitted).
35. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, 8 Stat. 80, 82. Article IV provided that
creditors would "meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value ... of all bona fide
Debts heretofore contracted."
36. See FARRAND, supra note 34, at 46-47; NEVINs, supra note 26, at 644-56; see also MERRILL
JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION,
1781-1789, at 6-18, 68-69, 261-81 (1950) (discussing history of peace treaty, including growing political
opposition during this period to treaty's assurances of debt repayment). For analysis of some justifications
for not enforcing the repayment of the debts, see WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 30-31 (1995).
37. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1972). "Unhappiness
with state disregard of treaties was repeatedly voiced at the Constitutional Convention ... and was a
particular impetus to the explicit establishment of the supremacy of treaties." Id. at 295 n.8 (citations
omitted).
38. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) ("The Framers'
Convention was called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were
several their people in respect of foreign affairs were one.") (citation omitted).
39. See Holt, supra note 33, at 1453-58.
40. James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 167 n. 157 (1983);
see Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury "De Medietate
Linguae": A History and A Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 783-96 (1994). See generally
MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994) (analyzing intellectual history of mixed juries).
Despite the Latin name, trials de medietate linguae rested more on the status of the jurors as
noncitizens than on the ability to speak a language other than English. See Ramirez, supra, at 781-82; see
also A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS
188 (4th ed. 1962) ("The common law allowed a foreigner the privilege of having half the jurors in his
case persons of his nationality, known as the jury de medietate linguae.") (footnote omitted).
41. See Oldham, supra note 40, at 167-71.
[Vol. 21: 1
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England, trials de medietate linguae originally were designed to provide relief
for Jews, "[t]he archetypal alien in medieval society."42 Britain extended the
right first to alien merchants and, in the 1300s, to all aliens.43 The device
represented "a crown policy to encourage foreign merchants and foreign
artisans to come to England."'
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, trials de medietate linguae
had existed in the mother country for over five centuries. The mixed jury was
discussed in a handful of state court appellate decisions in the 1700s and
1800s, 45 before ultimately disappearing into obscurity.' Some of the
Framers were aware of trials de medietate linguae. For example, James
Madison, in challenging the alien and sedition laws enacted in the late
1790s, 47 recognized "that, except on charges of treason, an alien has, besides
all the common privileges, the special one of being tried by a jury, of which
one half may be also aliens."48
42. Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 849 (1976); see
Oldham, supra note 40, at 168. Although originally half of the jury was to be composed of aliens of the
same nationality as the alien party, the procedure evolved to allow aliens from any country to serve as
jurors. See WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 228 (1852); Oldham, supra note 40, at 169-
70.
43. See LaRue, supra note 42, at 849-50; see also FORSYTH, supra note 42, at 228-29 (discussing
British mixed jury practice); 5 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104 (1966)
(mentioning mixed jury in discussion of medieval law merchant in England); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE
JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 58, 80-81 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing mixed jury of foreign
merchants); Gordon W. Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in International
Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1074-75 (1983) (describing mixed juries in commercial context).
44. LaRue, supra note 42, at 850; see Ramirez, supra note 40, at 783-89; see also JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 94 n.4 (1898) (stating
that mixed juries were "founded on considerations of policy and fair dealing" and offering example of
German merchant in contract action allowed to have half of jury consist of German merchants) (citation
omitted). Procedural fairness to the noncitizen also was a consideration. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 369 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that mixed juries were "authorized by statute, probably
as much because of the difference of language and customs between [the alien] and Englishmen, and the
greater probability of his defense being more fully understood, as because it would be heard in a more
friendly spirit by jurors of his own country and language") (emphasis added); Oldham, supra note 40, at
170-71 (noting that mixed jury "emerged to ensure a jury able to understand the point of view of the alien
party").
Mixed juries were used in England to some extent until the late.1800s, when they were abolished
by statute. See SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & EDwIN G. MERRIAM, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION,
CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND JURIES § 17, at 19 (1882); see also Abner J.
Mikva & Gerald L. Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "Hostage Act", 49 U. CH. L. REV. 292, 307-14
(1982) (outlining historical context surrounding tense United States-British relations that culminated in
abolition of mixed juries in Britain).
45. See LaRue, supra note 42, at 850-53 (analyzing decisions); Ramirez, supra note 40, at 789-96
(same).
46. See LaRue, supra note 42, at 853-63; Ramirez, supra note 40, at 789-96; see also
Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 191-93 (Mass. 1986) (recounting history of trials de medietate
in Massachusetts).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 193-97 (discussing laws).
48. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 556 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1988) [hereinafter ELLIOT] (Madison's Report on the Virginia
Resolutions). Madison "may have overstated [the mixed jury's] omnipresence, although it was still the law
in Virginia." Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 936 n.146 (1991) (citing
authority); see also I FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 65, at 467 (1959) (stating
that juries de medietate linguae have "never been recognized to any considerable extent in the United
States"); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 880 (1994) (observing that mixed jury was used "occasionally" in United
States).
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Thus, the existence of mixed juries showed a sensitivity to the need for
procedural devices to protect noncitizens. A desire to ensure a more impartial
forum to noncitizens and to foster commercial transactions influenced both
alienage jurisdiction and trials de medietate linguae.
2. Debate over the Alienage Provisions of Article III
Debate over the merits of alienage jurisdiction was not highly
controversial at either the Constitutional Convention or the various state
ratification conventions. Indeed, a consensus rapidly emerged on the need to
allow national courts to hear cases involving foreign citizens. Four of the five
plans presented at the Constitutional Convention provided for alienage
jurisdiction.49 Professor Holt reads this as "tell[ing] us something both about
the sins of state courts - they involved aliens - and about the importance of
alienage jurisdiction.""
Edmund Randolph's Virginia Plan provided for federal jurisdiction in
"cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such
jurisdictions may be interested.""' Although the Committee of the Whole
changed the language considerably,"2 the Committee of Detail revived and
reworked Randolph's language. With minor adjustments, it was unanimously
adopted by the delegates.53
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 80 offers the most comprehensive
exposition of the need to authorize the national courts to hear cases and
controversies involving noncitizens. In Hamilton's opinion, federal judicial
Thomas Jefferson, ambassador to France during the Constitutional Convention, wrote in a letter to
Madison that "[i]n disputes between a foreigner and a native, a trial by jury may be improper. But if this
exception cannot be agreed to, the remedy will be to model the jury, by giving the mediatas lingua, in
civil as well as criminal cases." Letter to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) [hereinafter LIFE
OF JEFFERSON]; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 258 (1984) ("In cases of life and death...
foreigners have a right to be tried by a jury, the one half foreigners, the other natives.").
49. See Holt, supra note 33, at 1460 & n.136. Holt cites 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Virginia plan) [hereinafter FARANDl
("jurisdiction... to hear & determine... cases in which foreigners ... may be interested"); I
FARRAND, supra, at 244 (New Jersey plan) ("authority to hear & determine ... in all cases in which
foreigners may be interested"); 1 id. at 292 (Hamilton's plan) ("jurisdiction ... in all causes in
which ... the citizens of foreign nations are concerned"); I id. at 432 (Mason's plan) ("jurisdiction...
shall extend to controversies ... between a State and the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or
subjects") (emphasis in original)). The fifth would have extended jurisdiction to "Questions ... on the
Construction of Treaties made by U.S." 3 id. at 608 (Pinckney's plan); see also James William Moore
& Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1964)
(observing that "all of the comprehensive proposals ... specifically provided for federal jurisdiction of
cases in which foreigners may be interested").
An open question was whether alienagejurisdiction should be exclusive, rather than concurrent. See
Holt, supra note 33, at 1467 (citing inter alia 3 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 527 (Mason of Virginia) and
Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, in 2 TIE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 2.4.58, 2.4 at 89-91 (H. Storing ed., 1981)).
50. Holt, supra note 8, at 551.
51. 1 FARRAND, supra note 49, at 22; see id. at 238 (Yates' notes) (stating that Randolph hoped
to preserve "security of foreigners where treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states
and that of the citizens thereof").
52. See Motion of Edmund Randolph and James Madison (June 13, 1787), in I id. at 223-24.
53. 3 id. at 169-70 (vote on diversity as recorded in Ezra Stiles' Diary (Dec. 21, 1787)).
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Alienage Jurisdiction
power should unquestionably include the ability to hear all cases "in which the
State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased."54 Hamilton
elaborated specifically on alienage jurisdiction.
Mhe peace of the WHOLE ought not be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the
responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.
As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other
manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the
security of the public tranquility. A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases
arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the
footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal
jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical whether an
unjust sentence against aforeigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to
the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one
which violated the stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still greater
objection to the distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not impossibility,
of a practical discrimination between the cases of one complexion and those of the other.
So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve national questions,
that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned
to the national tribunals.0
Hamilton makes several related points. Cases involving noncitizens may
have consequences for the nation as a whole in the conduct of foreign
relations and, thus, should be decided by national, not state, courts. Hamilton
further recognizes that all cases involving noncitizens, not simply those
involving treaties or international law, should be heard by the national courts.
Even if cases requiring the application of international law could be easily
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 23, at 534.
55. Id. at 568 (emphasis added); see Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government,
in THE STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1788, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 399-400 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (making similar arguments for alienage
jurisdiction). In calling for the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton had contended that:
[iln want of a federal Judicature, having cognizance of all matters of general concern in the
last resort, especially those in which foreign nations and their subjects are interested; from
which defect, by the interference of the local regulations of particular States militating directly
or indirectly against the powers vested in the Union, the national treaties will be liable to be
infringed, the national faith to be violated, and the public tranquility to be disturbed.
1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305-06 (2d ed. 1903) (Resolution for a General Convention,
June 30, 1783) (emphasis added).
A member of the Maryland State Convention advocating ratification emphasized similar themes:
The purpose of extending so far the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, is to give every
assurance to the general government, of afaithful execution of its laws, and to give citizens,
states, and foreigners, an assurance of the impartial administration of justice. Without the
salutary institution, the federal government might frequently be obstructed, and its servants
want protection. It is calculated not as an engine of oppression, but to secure the blessings of
peace and good order. The provisions respecting different states, their citizens, and foreigners,
if not absolutely necessary, are much to be applauded. The human mind is so framed, that the
slightest circumstance may prevent the most upright and well known tribunal from giving
complete satisfaction; and there may happen a variety of cases, where the distrust and
suspicion may not be altogether destitute of a just foundation.
Aristides, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, Addressed to the Citizens of the United
States of America, and Particularly to the People of Maryland (written by Alexander Contee Hanson,
member of the Maryland State Convention, dated Jan. 1, 1788) (emphasis added), in PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 238 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1971).
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distinguished from cases involving local matters, the possible impact on
domestic tranquility (i.e., the potential for war) would be the same for either
type of case. In referring to the "preservation of the public faith," Hamilton
presumably acknowledges the importance of the perceptions of impartiality
created by allowing the national courts to hear alienage cases. In emphasizing
appearances, Hamilton diplomatically downplays the actual partiality of the
state courts in favor of local residents. This should not be surprising if one
views the Federalist as designed to promote ratification of the Constitution by
the various states.
The debates at the Constitutional Convention and the state ratification
conventions reflected concerns similar to those expressed by Hamilton. For
example, in discussing alienage jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction over
controversies involving foreign states, James Madison asked, "[c]ould there
be a more favorable or eligible provision to avoid controversies with foreign
powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of the Union to drag the
whole community?"" William Davie of North Carolina emphasized this
foreign relations dimension:
If our courts of justice did not decide in favor of foreign citizens and subjects when they
ought, it might involve the whole Union in a war .... To the decision of all causes which
might involve the peace of the Union may be referred, also, that of controversies between
the citizens or subjects of foreign states and citizens of the United States .... Mhe denial
of justice is one of the just causes of war. If these controversies were left to the decision
of particular states, it would be in their power, at any time, to involve the continent in a
war, usually the greatest of all national calamities. It is certainly clear that where the peace
of the Union is affected, the general judiciary ought to decide."s
Other Article III grants of federal jurisdiction also reflected the Framers'
foreign relations concerns. Granting the federal courts admiralty jurisdiction,
it was argued, would help maintain good relations with foreign citizens and
nations."8 Reflecting similar hopes, Article III ultimately provided for federal
jurisdiction "in all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls" as well as in cases and cbntroversies arising under treaties.59 In
56. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 533-34 (Madison). Madison emphasized that uniformity was
desired in the interpretation of treaties by the federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving
ambassadors and foreign ministers, as well as over admiralty and maritime cases. See 3 id. at 532
(Madison). Indeed, one might surmise from Madison's comments that he viewed alienage jurisdiction as
more important than simple diversity jurisdiction. See 3 id. at 533 (Madison) ("As to its cognizance of
disputes between citizens of different states, I will not say it is a matter of much importance. Perhaps it
might be left to the state courts.").
57. 4 id. at 158-59 (Davie); see also Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast (Dec.
24, 1787), in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 204 (1983)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("[ihere is a particular & very cogent reason for securing to
foreigners a trial ... in afederal court. With respect to foreigners, all of the states form but one nation.
This nation is responsible for the conduct of all its members towards foreign nations, their citizens &
subjects; and therefore ought to possess the power of doing justice to the latter. Without this power, a
single state, or one of its citizens, might embroil the whole union in a foreign war.") (emphasis in
original).
58. See STORY, supra note 23, §§ 867-68, at 616-17; see, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 49, at 124
(notes of Madison) (recording that James Wilson of Pennsylvania "said the admiralty jurisdiction ought
to be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of
particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen").
59. U.S. CONT. art. II, § 2.
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addition, the Supremacy Clause makes treaties, in addition to laws passed by
Congress, the supreme law of the land.6" The importance of foreign relations
concerns distinguished alienage from diversity jurisdiction.
That does not imply that no similarities existed between the Framers'
rationales for alienage and diversity jurisdiction. As with diversity
generally,61 an interest in fostering commerce influenced decisions regarding
alienage.62 In defending the breadth of Article I, a leading figure in its
drafting, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, defended diversity and alienage
jurisdiction on precisely these grounds:
[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that foreigners,
as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they may resort? I would
ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at the mercy of the laws of Rhode
Island. I ask, further, How will a creditor feel who had his debts at the mercy of tender
laws in other states? It is true that, under this Constitution, these particular iniquities may
be restrained in the future; but, sir, there are other ways of avoiding payment of debts.
There have been installment acts, and other acts of a similar effect. Such things, sir, destroy
the very sources of credit ... It was thought proper to give the citizens offoreign states
full opportunity of obtaining justice in the general courts, and this they have by its appellate
jurisdiction; therefore, in order to restore credit with those foreign states, that part of the
article is necessary. I believe the alteration that will take place in their minds when they
learn the operation of this clause, will be a great and important advantage to our country;
nor is it any thing but justice; they ought to have the same security against the state laws
that may be made, that the citizens have; because regulations ought to be equally just in one
case as in the other. Further, it is necessary to preserve peace with foreign nations.6
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.... ."). See generally CHARLES HENRY BUrLER, THE TREATY-
MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 163-196, at 285-338 (1902) (analyzing events at Constitutional
Convention concerning national government's treaty-making power).
61. See, e.g., 3 ELuOT, supra note 48, at 534-35 (presenting argument by Madison that diversity
jurisdiction would facilitate interstate commerce).
62. As Joseph Story later observed in his famous commentary on the Constitution,
it may be remarked, that it is of great national importance to advance public, as well as
private credit, in our intercourse with foreign nations and their subjects. Nothing can be more
beneficial in this respect, than to create an impartial tribunal, to which they may have resort
upon all occasions, when it may be necessary to ascertain, or enforce their rights. Besides;
it is not wholly immaterial, that the law to be administered in cases of foreigners is often very
distinct from the mere municipal code of a state, and dependent upon the law merchant, or the
more enlarged consideration of international rights and duties, in a case of conflict of the
foreign and domestic laws. And it may fairly be presumed, that the national tribunals will,
from the nature of their ordinary functions, become better acquainted with the general
principles, than other courts, however enlightened, which are rarely required to discuss them.
STORY, supra note 23, § 889, at 634-35 (emphasis added).
63. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 491-93 (Wilson) (emphasis added). Wilson went on:
Let us suppose the case, that a wicked law is made in some one of the states, enabling a
debtor to pay his creditor with the fourth, fifth, or sixth part of the real value of the debt, and
this creditor, a foreigner, complains to his prince or sovereign, of the injustice that has been
done him. What can that prince or sovereign do? Bound by inclination, as well as duty, to
redress the wrong his subject sustains from the hand of perfidy, he cannot apply to the
particular guilty state, because he knows that, by the Articles of Confederation, it is declared
that no state shall enter into treaties. He must therefore apply to the United States; the United
States must be accountable. "My subject has received a flagrant injury: do me justice, or I will
do myselfjustice." If the United States are answerable for the injury, ought they not to possess
the means of compelling the faulty state to repair it? They ought; and this is what is done
here. For now, if complaint is made in consequence of such injustice, Congress can answer,
"Why did not your subject apply to the General Court, where the unequal and partial laws of
a particular state would have had no force?"
Id. at 493.
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Madison focused specifically on the negative commercial impact of the
treatment of noncitizens in the state courts: "We well know, sir, that
foreigners cannot get justice done them in [the state] courts, and this has
prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us.""
The Antifederalists did not direct their wrath at alienage jurisdiction,
though some of their objections to diversity and the creation of the federal
courts apply with equal force to alienage jurisdiction.65 One concern of the
Antifederalists was that, if noncitizens could sue in federal court, British
creditors would benefit at the expense of local debtors. Consider the
comments of George Mason of Virginia, a prominent Antifederalist and, like
his fellow Virginian Patrick Henry, an ardent protector of debtors:6"
[Federal] jurisdiction ... extends to controversies between citizens of different states. Can
we not trust our state courts with the decision of these? If I have a controversy with a man
in Maryland. ... are not the state courts competent to try it? Is it suspected that they would
enforce the payment if unjust, or refuse to enforce it if just? The very idea is ridiculous.
What! carry me a thousand miles from home - from my family and business - to where,
perhaps, it will be impossible to prove that I paid it? . . .Is there any necessity for this
power? ... Why should the federal courts have this cognizance? Is it because one lives on
one side of the Potomac, and the other on the other? . . What effect will this power have
between British creditors and the citizens of this state? This is a ground on which I shall
speak with confidence. Every one, who heard me speak on the subject, knows that I always
spoke for the payment of British debts. I wish every honest debt to be paid. Though I would
wish to pay the British creditor, yet I would not put in his power to gratify private malice
to our injury... .A dispute between aforeign citizen or subject and a Virginian cannot be
tried in our own courts, but must be decided in the federal court. Is this the case in any
other country?. . .This is an innovation which is utterly unprecedented and unheard-of
Cannot we trust the state courts with disputes between a Frenchman, or an Englishman, and
a citizen; or with disputes between two Frenchmen? This is disgraceful; it will annihilate
your state judiciary: it will prostrate your legislature.67
64. 3 id. at 583 (Madison); see 3 id. at 478 (Randolph) ("[Tihe Judiciary... are to in force [sic]
the performance of private contracts. The British debts, which are withheld contrary to treaty, ought to
be paid. Not only the law of nations, but justice and honor, require that they be punctually discharged.").
These comments, similar to those of William Davie, see supra text accompanying note 57, show the
interrelationship between foreign relations and commercial concerns.
65. See, e.g., 3 ELLIoT, supia note 48, at 523 (Mason objecting to diversity and other forms of
federal jurisdiction).
66. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTNEDERALisrs 223-24 (1961).
67. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 526-27 (Mason) (emphasis added) (emphasis in original deleted);
see 3 id. at 579-80 (Henry) (claiming that "British debtors will be ruined by being dragged to the federal
court"); Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), in THE ANTrEDERALIsTS 230 (Cecilia M.
Kenyon ed., 1966) ("1 do not ... see the need of opening a newjurisdiction ... of opening a new scene
of expensive law suits, of suffering foreigners, and citizens of different states, to drag each other many
hundred miles into the federal courts.").
Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia also focused on the impact of alienage jurisdiction on debt
collection:
An honorable gentleman observed, to-day, that there is no instance where foreigners have this
advantage over the citizens. What is the reason for this? Because a Virginian creditor may go
about for a lamentable number of years before he can get justice, while foreigners will get
justice immediately. What is the remedy? Honesty. Remove the procrastination of justice,
make debts speedily payable, and the evil goes away. But you complain of the evil because
you will not remove it. If a foreigner can recover his debts in six months, why not make a
citizen do so? There will then be reciprocity.
3 ELLIoT, supra note 48, at 575 (Randolph).
Antifederalist concerns of this nature fueled the demand for a right to trial by jury ultimately
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. See Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from
an Unappreciated History, 44 HAsTINGs L.J. 579, 597-600 (1993); Charles W. Wolfram, The
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As the debates illustrate, Federalists contended that alienage jurisdiction
was necessary because state courts had proven to be biased against
noncitizens, while Antifederalists denied this. There has been spirited
academic debate about whether bias by state courts against citizens of other
states in fact existed in the years immediately preceding the Constitutional
Convention. 8 However, the historical record leaves little doubt that state
courts were biased against British creditors. 9 In the eyes of Judge Friendly,
a steadfast opponent of diversity jurisdiction, the experience under the Articles
of Confederation demonstrated the need for alienage jurisdiction: "[s]everal
states had failed to give foreigners proper protection under the treaties
concluded with England at the end of the Revolution. . . . Local animosity
was so great that only national tribunals could compel the enforcement of a
national treaty. "'7
Apart from the economic concerns that fueled dislike for the British, more
general antiforeign sentiments animated some of the Framers of the
Constitution. Benjamin Franklin, for example, was well known for deriding
German immigration to Pennsylvania,71 as well as the immigration of British
convicts.7' At the Constitutional Convention, debates about the citizenship
requirements for election to the House of Representatives and Senate reflected
an apprehension of foreigners.7' A trace of nativism was evident in the
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 656-730 (1973). The
Antifederalists hoped that juries might ensure fairness to domestic debtors in debt collection suits brought
by foreign debtors. See F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828, at 20, 37 (1994). Evidence suggests that, immediately after
ratification in Virginia, juries, even when ruling in favor of British creditors, limited the damages that
Virginian debtors were required to pay. See id. at 38-43.
68. See Frank, supra note 10, at 23-24 (summarizing debate). Based on an examination of state
appellate decisions before 1787, Judge Henry Friendly concluded that there was no evidence of bias by
state courts against nonresidents. See Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REv. 483, 493-97 (1928); see also Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520-26 (1928) (emphasizing that "available records
disclose no particular grievance against state tribunals for discrimination against litigants from without.
The real fear was of state legislatures, not of state courts . . . ."). But see Hessel E. Yntema & George
H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 876-78 & n.13 (1931)
(arguing that Friendly's analysis failed to demonstrate that local bias was "inconsequential"). However,
as Chief Justice Marshall observed, the perception of partiality by the state courts may justify diversity
jurisdiction. See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)
(acknowledging "possible fears and apprehensions" of foreign citizens and citizens of different states of
bias in state courts); see also Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1882) (stating that diversity
jurisdiction allowed "independent tribunals which might be supposed would be unaffected by local
prejudices and sectional views" to hear disputes); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 354 (1855)
(emphasizing that diversity jurisdiction attempts "to make the people think and feel ... that their relations
to each other were protected by the strictestjustice, administered in courts independent of all local control
or connection with the subject-matter of the controversy"); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction:A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 332-39 (1977) (presenting survey evidence
suggesting that problem of bias against nonresidents may vary by district and that diversity jurisdiction
therefore may be more useful in some districts than in others).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 24-34.
70. Friendly, supra note 68, at 484 n.6 (citations omitted).
71. See MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 36-40 (2d ed. 1992).
72. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841 (1993).
73. See JONES, supra note 71, at 68-69; see, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 49, at 235-38 (notes
of Madison summarizing debate on length of citizenship requirement for congressional office); 2 id. at 236
("Mr. Butler was decidely [sic] opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the
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opposition to alienage jurisdiction.74
In short, there is little dispute that the experience with the treatment of
noncitizens by the states before the Constitutional Convention was less than
ideal. This makes a significant difference in analyzing alienage and diversity
jurisdiction. At least at the time of the framing there was an undisputed need
for alienage jurisdiction, which was not the case for diversity.
3. Unanswered Questions
Article III's grant of alienage jurisdiction is not without its curiosities.
For example, one is left to wonder why the Constitution failed to provide for
alienage jurisdiction in any case in which an alien was a party, as opposed to
only to disputes between an alien and a citizen.75 Resolution of any dispute
involving a foreigner - whether with a U.S. citizen or with a citizen of
another nation - in an American court might have foreign policy
consequences. For example, claims might be made that the state courts favor
one foreign national over another. The Framers appeared to recognize this
potential. In explaining the rationale for alienage jurisdiction, Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 80 suggests that federal jurisdiction might be
appropriate in suits between aliens.76 Nevertheless, Article I limits the
exercise of jurisdiction to cases and controversies "between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
Another oddity is that the Framers failed to state expressly which law
Country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct
from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous."); 2 id. at 237-38 (noting similar objections of
Gouvemour Morris who advocated fourteen year citizenship requirement for senators); see also 3 id. at
61 (Letter from John Jay to George Washington dated July 25, 1787) (questioning whether it is "wise &
seasonable" to permit "admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government" and
advocating that it be declared "that the Command [sic] in chief of the american army shall not be given
to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born citizen.") (emphasis in original). The Constitution ultimately
provided for citizenship requirements of seven years for the House of Representatives and nine years for
the Senate. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 3. The President must be "a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution . . . ." Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
74. Here is an example:
[Clan there be justice in allowing a foreigner, who resides at the federal court, to drag a
citizen with whom he has any money transaction, from Georgia to the federal court to answer
the foreigners suit? Is there a nation in the world in which an American has such a superiority
over the natives? Is it not always held, that the utmost a foreigner can expect, is to be upon
a par with the natives? what [sic] foreigner will disire [sic] to become a citizen, when by so
doing he will lose that extraordinary pre-eminence? One would think it was calculated to make
our country swarm with foreigners, instead of emigrants - and invite them to prey upon the
American natives, who must yield to every demand ofa foreigner, or be utterly ruined in the
litigation.
Letter in Virginia Independent Chronicle (Nov. 14, 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 57,
at 104-05.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity .... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, andforeign States, Citizens or Subjects.") (emphasis
added).
76. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 23, at 536 ("So great a proportion of the cases in
which foreigners are parties involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to
refer all those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.") (emphasis added); see also 3
ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 527 (Mason) ("Cannot we trust the state courts with disputes between a
Frenchman, or an Englishman, and a citizen; or with disputes between two Frenchmen?") (emphasis
added).
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might be applied to disputes between citizens and aliens. Joseph Story in his
famous Commentaries on the Constitution suggests that federal common law
might apply to alienage cases.' This makes sense if one fears that parochial
state laws applied to disputes involving foreigners might embroil the country
in international disputes. However, the dominant view is that state law applies
to alienage cases.78
B. The First Congress
The legislative history of the much studied Judiciary Act of 1789 fails to
add much to our understanding of the origins of alienage jurisdiction.79
Debate over the Act centered on the creation of inferior federal courts. 80 The
limited information gleaned from the congressional debates, however,
confirms the conclusions drawn from the review of the discussion of Article
I's grant of alienage jurisdiction at the Constitutional Convention and state
ratification conventions about the need for such jurisdiction.
As was the case for the Constitution, all the proposals of the Judiciary
Act provided for alienage jurisdiction. A first draft of a bill considered by a
committee limited diversity as well as alienage jurisdiction to suits brought
against noncitizens."' This provision, of course, would have precluded
foreign creditors from utilizing the federal courts to collect debts, as
Antifederalists feared.82 The Senate bill reported by the committee broadened
the provision and provided for concurrent jurisdiction in cases in which "a
forriegner, [sic] or citizen of another State than that in which the suit is
brought is a party.-"8 Ultimately, section 11 of the Judiciary Act provided
for jurisdiction over cases in which "an alien is a party, or the suit is between
a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State." 4 A student of the historical record noted that "the words of the alien
clause of section 11 passed unchallenged (at least insofar as we have any
record). "85
77. See STORY, supra note 23, § 889, at 634-35 (discussing alienage jurisdiction and stating that
"law to be administered in cases of foreigners is often very distinct from the mere municipal code of a
state, and dependent upon the law merchant, or the more enlarged consideration of international rights and
duties, in a case of conflict of the foreign and domestic laws"); see also Borchers, supra note 9 (arguing
that federal common law should be applied to diversity cases); William A. Fletcher, The General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1513, 1517-21 (1984) (describing early use of common law by federal courts in variety of contexts).
78. See Warren, supra note 6, at 83. But see Rrrz, supra note 6, at 134 (disputing claim that Rules
of Decision Act requires application of state law in diversity cases); Borchers, supra note 9, at 111-17
(same); Holt, supra note 33, at 1506-07 (same).
79. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 457-508
(1971); RITz, supra note 6, at 4; Holt, supra note 33, at 1424-25; Warren, supra note 6, at 49.
80. See Warren, supra note 6, at 67.
81. See id. at 78 n.67.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
83. Judiciary Bill of June 12, 1789, in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES: FUNDING AcT THROUGH
MILITIA BILL 1172, 1179 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986); see also Warren, supra
note 6, at 77-78.
84. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added).
85. Dennis J. Mahoney, A Historical Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 725,
732 (1982).
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Not surprisingly, the Congress that enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789
empowered the federal courts to decide alienage cases for reasons similar to
those offered by the Framers in providing the jurisdictional grant in Article
IIM.86 In endorsing the Federalist explanation of the need for alienage
jurisdiction, William Loughton Smith, a member of the First Congress from
South Carolina, recognized that "our Juries" were "generaly [sic] prejudiced"
against "foreigners" and that
[t]he Laws of nations & Treaties were too much disregarded in the several States - Juries
were too apt to be biased against them, in favor of their own citizens & acquaintances; it
was therefore necessary to have general Courts for causes in which foreigners were parties
or citizens of different States; hence arises this partiality which offends you; perhaps it may
be carried too far.Y
As might be expected, in light of the concerns expressed at the
Constitutional Convention, the limited criticism of alienage jurisdiction
reflected sympathy for local debtors.88 Friction between local debtors and
foreign creditors greatly affected debate over the Judiciary Act, as it did at the
Constitutional Convention. One of the more fascinating compromises involved
the $500 amount in controversy requirement. Antifederalists supported the
requirement because it "would prevent many cases of small amount, thus
presumptively those concerning poor people, from being brought into federal
86. Id. at 733.
In his famous analysis of the Judiciary Act, Charles Warren summarized the debates culminating in
the provisions providing the statutory authorization for alienage and diversity jurisdiction:
[t]he chief and only real reason for this diverse citizenshipjurisdiction was to afford a tribunal
in which a foreigner or citizen of another State might have the law administered free from the
local prejudices or passions which might prevail in a State Court against foreigners or non-
citizens. The Federal Court was to secure to a non-citizen the application of the same law
which a State Court would give to its own citizens, and to see that within a State there should
be no discrimination against non-citizens in the application of justice. There is not a trace of
any other purpose than the above to be found in any of the arguments made in 1787-1789 as
to this jurisdiction.
Warren, supra note 6, at 83 (footnote omitted).
87. The Letters of William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, 69 S.C. HisT. MAG. 1, 22-23
(1968) (letter dated Aug. 10, 1789).
88. Representative Michael J. Stone of Maryland, for example, focused on the infringement of
alienage jurisdiction on state citizens in debt collection cases:
[I]f a debt is due to a foreigner, may it not be sued in any part of the Union? ... [Floreigners may sue
and be sued in all the States .... [D]o gentlemen now contend, that these suits shall be
exclusively in the Continental courts? If they do, it would be an infringement of the private
contracts .... The citizen might suppose, when he contracted his debt, that he might bring
his suit in a State court; if you exclude him from this privilege, you destroy the right he had;
a right, notwithstanding all that may be affirmed of the wisdom, honesty, and expedition of
the courts of the United States, yet to him it may be ten to one better to be secured in his
rights in State courts .... [lIt has not been fully considered how far the inconveniences
heretofore sustained may be compared to the inconveniences which may hereafter
happen ....
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 825-26 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
Similarly, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia "was opposed to 'vexatious oppressive' trials in cases
'concerning property between Citizens of different States, and between Citizens and foreigners' in distant
courts sitting possibly without juries." Holt, supra note 33, at 1480 (footnote omitted) (citing Enclosure
in Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), reprinted in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE
MASON 999 (R. Rutland ed., 1970)).
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court, and it would also exclude a huge number of the British debt claims. " "
This represented a significant compromise between Federalists and
Antifederalists on an issue of conflict between debtors and creditors.90 From
the outset, the amount in controversy requirement significantly limited the
number of alienage cases that could be brought in federal court.9'
Antifederalists expressed some concern with alienage jurisdiction.
However, because their primary desire was to limit the power of the federal
courts and reserve as much power as possible to the states,92 a hotly
contested issue was whether the federal courts would have jurisdiction over
federal question cases. As part of a compromise, the Judiciary Act ultimately
provided the federal courts with diversity (including alienage) but not federal
question jurisdiction. 93
Like the Framers of the Constitution, Congress certainly had foreign
relations in mind when it enacted the Judiciary Act. For example, the Act
provided for federal jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases94 as well
as over cases involving ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.9'
In addition, section 9(b) of the Act, popularly known as the Alien Tort Claims
Act, provided that the federal courts have jurisdiction over "cases where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
89. Holt, supra note 33, at 1487-88 (footnotes omitted); see Warren, supra note 6, at 78; see also
William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 497 & n.168 (1986) (noting that few tort awards at time of
passage of Judiciary Act were anywhere near $500); William R. Casto, The First Congress's
Understanding of Its Authority Over the Federal Courts'Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1985)
(observing that, as of 1789, "a great part of the aggregate British debt was for individual sums of less than
five hundred dollars"). "Although the amount in controversy limitation was driven in part by a desire to
bar British creditors from the federal courts, the limitation also was inserted to protect small debtors from
being forced to travel long distances to defend minor claims." CASTO, supra note 36, at 53. British
creditors ultimately found it difficult to recover debts less than $500 in the courts of the various states.
See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 436-37 (1962). In
1802, the United States agreed to pay Great Britain a lump sum for violating Article IV of the Treaty of
Paris. See CAsTo, supra note 36, at 101.
Professor Ritz contends that the language and punctuation of the Judiciary Act demonstrates that the
amount in controversy requirement was not to be applied to alienage cases, see RITZ, supra note 6, at 57,
while Professor Holt finds no evidence that the drafters of the language had this intention. See Holt, supra
note 33, at 1495 n.258. Any ambiguity in this regard has been clarified in subsequent revisions of the
statute that make it clear that the amount in controversy requirement applies to both categories of cases.
See supra note 6 (quoting current version of statute).
90. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 466 (1989). The genesis of the amount in controversy requirement thus
tends to undermine any suggestion that it historically has been designed primarily to permit only the
federal court to hear "significant" diversity and alienage cases. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101 (stating that Congress set amount in
controversy requirement "not so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so
low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies").
91. See infra text accompanying notes 337-42 (analyzing how increasing amount in controversy
requirement has adversely affected alienage cases).
92. See Holt, supra note 33, at 1478-85; Warren, supra note 6, at 67-70.
93. See Mishkin, supra note 7, at 157.
94. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
95. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81; see also James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 564-65 (1994)
(describing how Judiciary Act conferred federal jurisdiction over actions brought by and against
ambassadors and consuls).
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United States. "96
Although the alienage jurisdiction provisions of the United States Code
have changed much since 1789, 97 one important characteristic has not.
Beginning with section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, alienage jurisdiction
has been intermingled in the diversity statute. This is not merely of interest
to federal courts trivia buffs. As we shall see, this feature of the diversity
statute has had a distinct impact on the implementation of alienage jurisdiction
since 1789.
C. Summary
The little disputed belief that the state courts had unfairly treated foreign
citizens resulted in general agreement at the Constitutional Convention that
claims of noncitizens should be within the jurisdiction of the national courts.
The motivations of the Framers may have been more pragmatic than idealistic.
Adverse foreign relations consequences, resulting from the perception of
foreign governments that the state courts were biased, clearly influenced the
Framers. A desire to ensure, and increase, the flow of capital from Britain
and other nations into the United States, with its fledgling economy, did as
well.
A consensus emerged that favored alienage jurisdiction. When it came
time for ratification, even opposition to diversity did not necessarily mean
opposition to alienage jurisdiction.98 In the end, alienage jurisdiction was
included as part of Article III without major controversy. With little fanfare,
the First Congress made alienage jurisdiction one of the first types of
jurisdiction that the new federal courts could exercise.
III. THE EVOLUTION
As we have seen, section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred broad
powers on the federal courts to hear alienage cases. Congress has amended
96. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 78 (partially codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see Burley, supra note 90, at 465 ("Virtually every commentator on the
[Alien Torts] Statute has tied it to the Framers' desire to avoid embroiling the nation in conflicts with
foreign states arising from U.S. mistreatment of foreign citizens.") (footnote omitted). Section 9(b) has
been used increasingly in recent years as the basis for suits by private parties against foreign leaders for
human rights abuses. See, e.g., Kadic.v. Karadzic, No. 94-9035, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28826 (2d Cir.
Oct. 13, 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. See infra Part III.A.
98. See, e.g., Many Customers, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Dec. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 306, 308 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976) (advocating deletion of diversity jurisdiction but not alienage jurisdiction from Article Ill); Letter
of Agrippa, XVIII dated Feb. 5, 1788 in the Massachusetts Gazette (attributed to James Winthrop), in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1970) (contending
that federal jurisdiction should be limited to, among other cases, those "in which a foreigner residing in
some foreign country shall be a party"); see also JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS:
CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788, at 158 (1961) ("On the whole, most Antifederalists were
satisfied with all or with the greater part of the judiciary article; the need for a national court system was
nowhere challenged and most of its powers were accepted without question.").
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the diversity statute implementing alienagejurisdiction periodically since 1789,
but has continued the tradition of providing for alienage and diversity
jurisdiction in the same statutory provision. Although most of the changes
have been minor, amendments to the general diversity provisions have had an
adverse impact, often unintended, on alienage cases. Most recently, in an
attempt to reduce the diversity caseload of federal courts, Congress has
accelerated this process. Similar to the tack taken by Congress, the Supreme
Court has tended to construe the alienage provisions of the diversity statute
no differently than those pertaining to plain vanilla diversity cases.
A. Congressional Tinkering
This Section will analyze two sorts of congressional action that have had
a special impact on alienage cases. It first looks at congressional efforts to
limit the number of diversity cases in federal court and the apparently
unintended impact on alienage cases. The section next considers a major
amendment to the statute that deems lawful permanent residents (i.e., lawful
immigrants to the country who have not become naturalized citizens) to be
state citizens.
1. Limitations on Diversity Jurisdiction
In the last two centuries, Congress has made relatively few major
amendments to the diversity statute expressly intended to change the scope of
alienage jurisdiction. Instead, Congress more often has affected alienage
jurisdiction indirectly by amending the general diversity statute. This approach
has resulted, in part, from the habitual failure to consider alienage and
diversity as independent bases of federal jurisdiction.99
a. The Citizenship Provisions
The first major overhaul of the citizenship provisions of the diversity
statute came in 1875. Supreme Court decisions had held that it was
unconstitutional for the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over disputes
between aliens."° In order to conform the statute with these decisions,
Congress amended the diversity statute to allow jurisdiction over "a
controversy between citizens of different States or . . .a controversy between
citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."' 0 '
The next major revision to the citizenship and alienage provisions came
in 1948. The Judicial Code of 1948 provided for jurisdiction over cases and
controversies satisfying the then existing $3000 amount in 'ontroversy
requirement between:
(1) citizens of different States;
99. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 23, at 141 n.1 (stating that distinction between diversity
and alienage cases "for most purposes... is unimportant, and in this book, as in the literature generally,
the two classes of cases will usually be dealt with under the general head of diversity").
100. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55 (discussing decisions).
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
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(2) citizens of a State and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties. 2
As Professor Moore observed, the 1948 amendments "lumped diversity and
alienage jurisdiction together under the title 'Diversity of Citizenship.'"
10 3
Besides codifying existing law and clarifying some questions, the 1948
amendments responded to problems created by lower court decisions
interpreting the predecessor statute. Specifically, the new section 1332(a)(3)
allowed for jurisdiction in cases between "citizens of different States and in
which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties." This
provision "overturn[ed] lower-court decisions refusing jurisdiction when a
New Yorker sued a Californian and a Frenchman; literally such an action is
neither between citizens of different states nor between citizens of a state and
of a foreign state" as the pre-1948 version of the statute required.' 4 Thus,
the 1948 amendments modestly expanded the scope of alienage jurisdiction in
a way consistent with the Framers' concerns.
Changes to the diversity statute dealing with corporate citizenship had a
different effect on alienage jurisdiction. Until 1958, corporations had been
treated solely as citizens of their state of incorporation. 05 To halt the
perceived abuse of diversity, Congress added section 1332(c) to expand the
citizenship of corporations in diversity cases."' That section, as amended,
currently provides that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business." 0 7
In amending this section, Congress apparently failed to consider the
impact of the new provision on foreign corporations."t° The predictable
102. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 930, 930.
103. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.71[4.-31, at 728 (2d ed.
1993).
104. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part 1), 36 U. CH. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1968) (citing JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 154
(1949)). For a careful description of the jurisdictional consequences of various permutations of political
status and domicile under § 1332 as amended, see generally John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes
in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvement Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 743-45 (1991).
105. See, e.g., Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 120-21 (1882).
106. See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099,
3101. The stated purpose of these amendments was to "ease the workload of our Federal courts by
reducing the number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts on the
fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists." Id. As part of the same effort to limit the flow of
diversity cases, Congress increased the amount in controversy requirement from $3000 to $10,000. See
infra text accompanying notes 115-20 (describing escalation of amount in controversy requirement).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
108. See George M. Eshak, Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction: The Dilemma of Dual Citizenship
and Allen Corporations, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 576 (1982); Marc Miller, Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction OverAlien Corporations, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 1458, 1470 (1983).
Similarly, congressional efforts to limit pendent party jurisdiction in cases "founded solely on section
1332" in the supplemental jurisdiction statute passed in 1990, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. IV 1992)
(added by Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 310(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14),
may have unintended effects on alienage cases. See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and
Hanpering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445,
474-75 (1991). But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About
Supplemental Jurisdiction?A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 954-55 (1991) (disputing this
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result was a wealth of litigation. "0 The established rule is that, as the plain
meaning of the statute suggests, foreign corporations are treated no differently
than domestic ones. Under section 1332(c), foreign corporations are deemed
to be citizens of both their nation of incorporation and principal place of
business."' Thus, if the principal place of business of a corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign nation is in a state, the corporation is
treated as a citizen of that state and cannot sue a citizen of the same state in
federal court."'
Strong arguments can be made for assuring the availability of a federal
forum in disputes involving a foreign corporation or any type of foreign
business association. State courts may be biased against foreign
corporations.112 Furthermore, negative foreign policy ramifications may
result if a foreign government concludes that a business organized under its
laws has been treated unfairly." 3 These arguments are consistent with the
foreign relations and commercial considerations that influenced the Framers
in providing Article M's grant of alienage jurisdiction." 4
b. The Amount in Controversy Requirement
As Congress clearly envisioned with respect to the $500 amount in
controversy requirement contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789,"' the
incremental increase of this requirement in the general diversity statute has
affected alienage cases. It increased from $500 in 1789116 to $2000 in
1887"t7 to $3000 in 1911"' to $10,000 in 1958". to its current amount
assertion). Although overriding the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989), the statute sought to preserve the Court's holding limiting pendent party jurisdiction in diversity
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. IV 1988) (appearing to codify Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-75 (1978), which held that federal court could not exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over claim brought by plaintiff against third party defendant when both were citizens of same
state, because to do so would thwart congressional requirement of complete diversity). Despite the fact
that alienage and diversity cases implicate wholly different concerns, Congress apparently failed to
consider whether the distinction should make a difference with respect to the availability of supplemental
jurisdiction in alienage cases.
109. See, e.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1556-61 (11th Cir. 1989); Int'l
Shipping Co., S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1003 (1989); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1150-53 (5th Cir. 1985).
110. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990
(9th Cir. 1994). But see Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding that § 1332(c) does not apply to foreign corporations).
111. See, e.g., Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 773-74 (9th Cir.
1992); Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32-35 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946
(1982).
112. See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing recurring antiforeign capital sentiment in United States).
113. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (emphasizing that,
because of foreign relations concerns, "'[gireat care and reserve should be exercised when extending our
notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field'") (citations omitted).
114. See supra Part II.A. (describing Framers' concerns); infra Part V.B.4 (proposing statutory
amendment to address these issues).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91 (discussing how $500 amount in controversy
requirement significantly limited number of cases that British creditors could bring in federal court).
116. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
117. -See Act of Mar. 3, 1887 § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552.
118. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911 § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091.
119. See Act of July 25, 1958 § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415.
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of $50,000 in 1988.12° As Congress obviously intended, the incremental
increases winnowed the number of diversity, including alienage, cases that
could be brought in federal court. Indeed, as we saw, that was the desired
effect of the $500 requirement provided for by the Judiciary Act of 1789.121
Whatever the potential for bias against the noncitizen or possible adverse
foreign policy or trade consequences of the case, alienage cases that fail to
satisfy this threshold requirement are screened out of federal court. However,
there is little, if any, evidence that Congress considered the discrete impact
on alienage cases of increasing the amount in controversy requirement in any
of the numerous amendments.
As amendments to the corporate citizenship and amount in controversy
requirements of the diversity statute illustrate, Congress repeatedly has
changed the law to limit the number of diversity cases that can be brought in
federal court without considering the negative impact on alienage cases. This
impact historically has not been considered carefully, if at all, in the
legislative process.
2. Lawful Permanent Residents as State Citizens
The most significant statutory change directly affecting alienage
jurisdiction came in 1988 when, as part of a compromise with those seeking
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, Congress narrowed such jurisdiction in
a number of important ways."
Since the early days of the nation until 1988, the Supreme Court had held
that alienage jurisdiction extended to suits between aliens domiciled in the
United States and state citizens."a In 1988, besides increasing the amount
in controversy requirement from $10,000 to $50,000 and making some minor
adjustments to the statute, 124  Congress drastically departed from
longstanding practice by adding a sentence to section 1332(a) that states that,
for purposes of the section as well as for removal (section 1441) and
interpleader (section 1335) jurisdiction, "an alien admitted to the United States
for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such
alien is domiciled."'2 This provision also is inconsistent with the well
120. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25, 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5985, 6005.
123. See, e.g., C.H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278, 282-83 (1906) (upholding
alienage jurisdiction in case involving Swedish citizen residing in United States); Breedlove v. Nicolet,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 413, 431-32 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) ("If originally aliens, they did not cease to be so,
or lose their right to sue in the federal court, by a residence in Louisiana. Neither the constitution nor acts
of [c]ongress require that aliens should reside abroad to entitle them to sue in the courts of the United
States.").
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also Oakley, supra note 104, at
739-48 (describing changes in law).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988); see, e.g., Paparella v. Idreco Invest S.p.A., 858 F. Supp. 283,
284-85 (D. Mass. 1994) (dismissing diversity action by Massachusetts citizen against Italian national who
was lawful permanent resident residing in Massachusetts). The language of the statute suggests that, if an
alien has not established a domicile in a state since becoming a lawful permanent resident, he or she cannot
be deemed to be a citizen of a state. Cf Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399.40 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974) (finding that French citizen's wife, who was once domiciled in Mississippi
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established rule "that one cannot be a citizen of a state without being a United
States citizen.""
Illustrating how little attention often is paid to alienage issues, this
provision was added relatively late in the legislative process, culminating in
the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. 27 There was precious
little debate and even less critical analysis of the need for and consequences
of the amendment changing the citizenship rules for noncitizens domiciled in
a state. 12' Neither Congress nor the chief proponents of the provision
considered any empirical evidence suggesting that such noncitizens were
involved in many alienage cases. Although a significant population of
noncitizens permanently reside in the country, 9 there is no evidence that
they are heavy users, much less abusers, of the federal courts. 3 ' Nor is
there evidence that Congress considered the potential adverse consequences
that might result from the operation of the amendment.
Despite the lack of Congressional attention, the provision deeming certain
lawful permanent residents to be domiciliaries of a state has far reaching
implications.' First, the amendment potentially allows an alien, who has
been admitted for permanent residence into the United States and is domiciled
in a state, to sue another alien in federal court, an unconstitutional result.'32
but moved away without establishing new domicile, was domiciled in Mississippi despite lack of intent to
return there).
126. 1 MoORE ET AL., supra note 103, 0.71[5], at 735 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Newman-
Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989).
127. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
128. For a comprehensive discussion of the sparse legislative history on this provision, see Oakley,
supra note 104, at 742 n.14. The most extensive Congressional explanation of the provision stated that:
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) currently gives the district courts diversity jurisdiction over actions
between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. Diversity jurisdiction
exists under this provision even though the alien may have been admitted to the United States
as a permanent resident. As any review of the immigration statistics indicates, large numbers
of persons fall within this category. There is no apparent reason why actions between persons
who are permanent residents of the same State should be heard by Federal courts merely
because one of them remains a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
134 CONG. REC. S16,299 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988). The Judicial Conference, which proposed the
amendment, offered similarly scant reasoning. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES HELD IN WASHINGTON D.C. MARCH 15, 1988 AND SEPTEMBER
14, 1988, at 76-77 (1988).
129. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 1992 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 17 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK] (compiling statistics
showing that over 1.8 million lawful permanent residents entered United States in fiscal year 1991, and
over 970,000 entered in fiscal year 1992).
130. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. See supra note 19 (reviewing statistics showing that
relatively small proportion of diversity cases for time period were brought by aliens).
131. As Professor Oakley succinctly states:
Although of limited applicability, this curious provision requires a nearly complete
reconceptualization of the rules of citizenship for diversity purposes. The provision invites
courts to adjudicate cases that may be beyond the constitutional power of the federal courts.
Given the modest legislative objective to rid the federal diversity docket of a small category
of essentially localized lawsuits, one must wonder whether Congress adopted the best means
to accomplish this modest end.
Oakley, supra note 104, at 741-42 (citations omitted).
132. See WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 24, at 155 (noting that exercise of jurisdiction in this instance
would conflict with Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809)); Kramer, supra note 21, at
122-23 (recommending changes in law to eliminate this constitutional difficulty); Oakley, supra note 104,
at 745.
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Consequently, the question whether a lawful permanent resident deemed to be
the citizen of a state may sue an alien, or vice versa, has resulted in a conflict
in the lower courts.'- There is no evidence that Congress considered this
possibility, much less that it intended to allow a select group of aliens to sue
other aliens in the federal courts.
Second, the provision is ambiguous about the types of immigrants to
whom it applies. The language, which states that "an alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence" will be treated as a citizen of the state
in which she is domiciled, is similar but not identical to that found in the
immigration laws. 34 The new language in section 1332 presumably has the
same meaning as "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" in the
comprehensive Immigration and Nationality Act, which term is defined as
"the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws."' 35 The few decisions directly addressing the statutory
ambiguity in the amendment have concluded that it was meant to conform to
the definition of lawful permanent resident under the immigration laws.'36
However, there are a number of immigration statuses short of lawful
permanent resident status that authorize noncitizens to remain indefinitely in
the country.'37 The new language in section 1332 arguably could encompass
these statuses. The lack of a cross-reference to the immigration laws and the
unexplained difference in language create unnecessary doubt.
There are also practical problems with the new provision of
section 1332(a) dealing with the citizenship of noncitizens. This new provision
creates the possibility that the purpose of the Framers in providing for
alienage jurisdiction in Article III - creating the appearance of a more
impartial national tribunal to avoid foreign entanglements and to foster
133. Compare Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing jurisdiction when
lawful permanent resident deemed to be citizen of state sued two defendants, one of whom was alien and
other of whom was citizen) with Arai v. Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Haw. 1991) (disallowing
jurisdiction in case in which alien and foreign corporation sued Hawaii corporation and two aliens who
were permanent residents) and, Lloyds Bank v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (disallowing
jurisdiction in case in which alien bank sued permanent resident alien and Connecticut resident) and
A.T.X. Export, Ltd. v. Mendler, 849 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (disallowing jurisdiction in case in
which alien sued alien who was permanent resident).
134. See 13B WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 10, § 3604, at 91 (Supp. 1994); see, e.g., Miller v.
Thermarite Party Ltd., 793 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
135. Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1988). The term
"immigrant" used in this definition is, in effect, a person who is in the country lawfully and who is not
a nonimmigrant. See id. § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988). Generally speaking,
"immigrants... come to take up permanent residence [in the country] whereas nonimmigrants enter for
a specific purpose to be accomplished during a temporary stay." THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEiNIKOFF ET
AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 122 (3d ed. 1995).
136. See Miller, 793 F. Supp: at 307-08; see also Donovan v. McIntosh Secur., Ltd., No. 90-
C5797, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18208 (N.D. III. Oct. 6, 1992) (denying motion for sanctions under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 based on legal error concerning provision because of its ambiguity); Kristensen v.
Dampierre, No. 89-C6683CSH, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8976 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1990) (holding that
nonimmigrant was not treated as state citizen by operation of § 1332(a)).
137. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act §§ 208-209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158-59 (1988) (asylees);
id. § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (parolees).
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international trade13 - may be frustrated in certain cases. A person, for
example, might be a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a
citizen of a foreign nation.139 The officials of a person's native country
might be offended if they believe that a state court has unfairly treated one of
their citizens, regardless of whether that citizen is a lawful permanent resident
of the United States."4 In light of the fact that the $50,000 amount in
controversy requirement increases the likelihood that the lawful permanent
residents who sue or are sued in federal court are involved in substantial
commercial activity, the elimination of a federal forum for resolving disputes
with such persons might well have economic and foreign relations
consequences for the nation.
Nor is there evidence that potential bias against lawful permanent
residents is any less prevalent than bias against any other type of
noncitizen.' 4 Lawful permanent residents may be the subject of scorn and
discrimination.' 42 Indeed, the states lawfully may (and do) discriminate
138. See supra Part II.A (summarizing debate at Constitutional Convention over alienage
jurisdiction).
139. Indeed, a desire to maintain one's citizenship in another nation is one reason why a noncitizen
may not naturalize to become a U.S. citizen. The United States traditionally has frowned upon dual
citizenship, see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 1055-60, though in recent years it has appeared
to be more tolerant of the status, see State Dep't Explains New Evidentiary Standards for Expatriation,
67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092 (Oct. 1990) (articulating new standards making it more difficult for
government to prove that person intended to renounce his or her U.S. citizenship by becoming citizen of
another country, thereby making dual citizenship easier to attain).
140. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (noting potential foreign relations consequences
of public benefits restrictions with respect to immigrants); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-
89 (1952) ("[Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with... the conduct of
foreign relations. . . .") (footnote omitted); Claire Cooper, Foes of Death Penalty Have A Friend:
Mexico, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 26, 1994, at Al (discussing Mexican government's intervention in death
penalty cases on behalf of its nationals).
141. Indeed, there is evidence that anti-immigrant sentiment affects citizens. See infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
142. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-23, at 1545-46 (2d ed.
1988) ("[lI]t is clear that aliens have historically suffered prejudice and bias and, as 'an identifiable class
of persons.., are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community.'")
(quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976)) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION 37-72 (1990) (finding that law barring employment of undocumented persons exacerbated
national origin employment discrimination, and that many Asian and Latino minorities lawfully in country
were adversely affected by, inter alia, employers' adoption of policy of hiring only United States-born
citizens). Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld certain forms of discrimination against lawful permanent
residents. See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. 67 (upholding congressional authority to exclude certain lawful
permanent residents from participation in medical benefit program); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)
(affirming order of deportation of longtime lawful permanent resident because of past membership in
Communist Party); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (permitting indefinite
detention of lawful permanent resident).
As Professor John Hart Ely wrote in analyzing whether aliens should be treated as a discrete and
insular minority for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[D]iscrimination against aliens seems a relatively easy case .... Aliens cannot vote in any
state, which means that any representation they receive will be exclusively "virtual." That fact
should at the very least require an unusually strong showing of a favorable environment for
empathy, something that is lacking here. Hostility toward "foreigners" is a time-honored
American tradition. Moreover, our legislatures are composed almost entirely of citizens who
have always been such. Neither, finally, is the exaggerated stereotyping to which that situation
lends itself ameliorated by any substantial degree of social intercourse between recent
immigrants and those who make the laws.
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against them in certain instances, such as making citizenship a requirement for
certain types of employment. Lawful permanent residents eligible for
naturalization may be viewed negatively by U.S. citizens for, among other
things, not becoming citizens.'" Some infamous anti-immigrant reactions
have been aimed at noncitizens who had come lawfully and permanently to the
United States.145
In light of the recurrent backlash against immigrants in this country,
which may have an impact on citizens from immigrant producing nations,'"
there is a need for a federal forum for noncitizens domiciled in the United
States. This need is especially great for some immigrants who are racial and
ethnic minorities and face even more significant disadvantages in the political
process due to their alienage status and the color of their skin.1
47
As a result of the 1988 amendment to section 1332(a), a lawful permanent
resident may be forced to have her disputes resolved in state court even
though there may be (or the immigrant or the officials of her country of origin
may perceive) bias on the part of electorally accountable state court judges.
This fear is all the more real because lawful permanent residents are not
citizens, cannot vote, and cannot serve on juries. 4  Though similar
problems exist in the federal courts, they are attenuated to some extent by the
presence of judges who are tenured for life. Thus, a strong argument can be
made for permitting a lawful permanent resident domiciled in a state to sue
her neighbor in federal court while a citizen of that same state could not.
Dual citizenship, which in recent years has become less disfavored under
federal law, creates problems of a similar nature to the 1988 amendment. The
prevailing judicially created rule is that a person's domestic citizenship is the
only relevant one for purposes of establishing alienage. 49 Although some
endorse this rule, 50 which is animated by the general desire to limit the
number of cases in federal court,' 5' it is of dubious wisdom. The
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 161-62 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
143. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (upholding citizenship requirement
for probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (public school teachers); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state troopers). But see Hampton, 426 U.S. 88 (invalidating citizenship
requirement for certain federal civil service positions).
144. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9, 16-17 (1990).
145. See infra Part IV.C.
146. See infra text accompanying note 209.
147. There is no evidence, however, that in providing for alienage jurisdiction the Framers were
attempting to protect aliens because of any differences of race between them and United States citizens.
Indeed, the Framers had the British principally in mind in drafting the alienage provisions. See supra Part
II.
148. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991); Sadat v.
Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1187 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
150. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3621, at 582; Currie, supra note 104, at 10 n.50;
Courtney J. Linn, Diversity Jurisdiction and Permanent Resident Aliens, 38 FED. B. NEws & J. 284, 287-
88 (1991).
151. See Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Raphael v. Hertzberg, 470 F. Supp. 984, 986 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) ("'fA] new rule that would extend the scope of § 1332 is particularly undesirable in light of
the ever-rising level of criticism of the very concept of diversity jurisdiction.'")); supra Part III.A.1
(observing congressional trend of limiting kinds of diversity cases that can be brought in federal court).
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interpretation effectively barring dual citizens from the federal courts is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which refers to "citizens
or subjects of a foreign state." Nothing in the statute suggests that persons of
dual nationality should be precluded from invoking alienage jurisdiction.
Moreover, although there conceivably is less bias against dual citizens than
aliens in state courts,152 this is not necessarily the case.
In short, the new provision of section 1332(a) deeming certain lawful
permanent residents to be citizens of their state of domicile is ill advised. The
same can be said with respect to the judicially established rule concerning dual
citizens. At the very least, Congress has failed to offer the careful
consideration that these rules warrant.
B. Judicial Gloss
The Supreme Court has decided relatively few major cases involving the
alienage provisions of the Judicial Code. One early exception involved the
breadth of the alienage jurisdiction granted by the Judiciary Act of 1789. In
the famous 1809 decision of Hodgson v. Bowerbank,53 the Court made it
clear that it would be unconstitutional for the federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over suits exclusively between noncitizens, which the plain
language of section 11 of the Judiciary Act appeared to authorize. 54 Since
then, the Court on many occasions has reaffirmed the rule that alienage
jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a dispute unless a U.S. citizen or state
is a party to the action. 55
The Court has decided few other alienage cases and has not offered any
major statements about the purposes of alienage jurisdiction. As previously
mentioned, the Court long ago ruled that a lawful immigrant domiciled in this
country remains an alien for alienage purposes so long as she remains
unnaturalized, a ruling that Congress overrode in 1988.156 Generally
speaking, the Court has imported the rules applicable to diversity cases to
alienage cases, a practice consistent with the longstanding failure to
differentiate between the two forms of jurisdiction. For example, the standard
152. See Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1185-86.
153. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
154. See supra text accompanying note 6 (quoting and citing act). There has been debate about
whether Hodgson held that § 11 of the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional or whether the Court merely
interpreted it in a manner consistent with congressional intent. Compare WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 24,
at 154 ("The 1789 Judiciary Act purported to extend jurisdiction to all suits in which an alien is a party.
The Court ... held that this was unconstitutional insofar as it might permit suit in federal courts between
two aliens, while the Constitution only authorizes jurisdiction of suits between a citizen of a state and an
alien." (footnote omitted)) with Mahoney, supra note 85 (arguing that Hodgson was case of statutory, not
constitutional, construction). The Court's reasoning in an earlier decision resolving the identical issue
supports the statutory construction argument: "IT]he llth section of the judiciary act can, and must,
receive a construction consistent with the constitution." Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14
(1800); see also Warren, supra note 6, at 79 (stating that Court in Hodgson "in order to hold it valid, was
obliged ... to read into [§ 11] a limitation which it did not actually contain" (footnote omitted)).
155. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983); Jackson v.
Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829); see also Eze v. Yellow Cab Co., 782 F.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1017 (1983).
156. See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing 1988 congressional amendment modifying rule).
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diversity rule that the citizenship of an alien cannot be presumed has been
applied to alienage cases.157 Similarly, the Court has interpreted the
diversity statute as requiring a variation of the rule of complete diversity in
alienage cases. 158
The Supreme Court also has resolved some narrow alienage questions of
little general significance. For example, the Court held that an Illinois
corporation could not sue a Venezuelan corporation, four Venezuelan citizens,
and a United States citizen domiciled in Venezuela because the United States
citizen was not a citizen of any state, and so the requirements of
subsections 1332(a)(2) and (a)(3) were not satisfied. 59 Alienage issues have
raised esoteric problems with respect to the United States territory of Puerto
Rico.' 60 In another case limited to its facts, the Court held that a
Panamanian company that had assigned its interest in a contract with a Haitian
corporation to a Texas attorney did so "improperly or collusively" to
manufacture federal alienage jurisdiction.'6
In short, the Supreme Court has addressed surprisingly few alienage cases
and even fewer of any great significance. .
IV. MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS
Due to concern with the federal judicial caseload, diversity jurisdiction
has been under siege for most of the twentieth century. Consequently, we
must consider whether, assuming that alienage jurisdiction was justifiable at
one time in our history, changes in the nation have rendered it obsolete. Even
though persuasive arguments may be made for the restriction, perhaps even
the abolition, of diversity jurisdiction, this does not necessarily mean that
alienage jurisdiction should be subject to the identical fate. Different rationales
underlie the two forms of federal jurisdiction and current conditions may
justify the retention of one but not the other.
In arguing for the restriction or abolition of diversity, some have claimed
that bias against nonresidents by state courts is minimal in today's mobile
society in which state lines are much less significant than they once were.
t6 2
This Section examines the analogous question - whether bias against
foreign citizens warrants the continued availability of alienage jurisdiction.
Contrary to Judge Henry Friendly's observation about diversity
157. See, e.g., Hennessy v. Richardson Drug Co., 189 U.S. 25, 34 (1903); Stuart v. Easton, 156
U.S. 46 (1895); Bors v. Preston, III U.S. 252, 255 (1884).
158. See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989); Cuebas y
Arredondo v. Cuebas y Arredondo, 223 U.S. 376, 386-88 (1912).
159. See Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828-29. The Court held that the court of appeals could
dismiss the stateless United States citizen and exercise jurisdiction. id. at 832-38; see also Conolly v.
Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556, 565 (1829) (allowing similar practice to save alienage case).
160. See, e.g., Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 346 (1920) (addressing
whether statutory "restriction ofjurisdiction to cases where all the parties on either side of the controversy
are 'not domiciled in Porto Rico' [sic] applies to aliens as well as to American citizens"); Cuebas y
Arredondo, 223 U.S. at 388 (holding that citizen of Puerto Rico could not sue defendants based on
alienage jurisdiction when one was Puerto Rican citizen).
161. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 827 (1969).
162. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 23, at 148.
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jurisdiction, 3 modern circumstances militate in favor of ensuring access to
a national forum to resolve disputes involving noncitizens just as much today
as, if not more so than, in 1787. History has demonstrated that the political
processes in the country are susceptible to antiforeign sentiment, sometimes
of a particularly virulent strain, which necessitates a forum more politically
insulated than that offered by most states. Though this danger is not present
in every alienage case, state court adjudication of disputes involving foreign
citizens continues to raise the possible adverse foreign policy and international
trade consequences feared by the Framers of the Constitution.
A. The Conventional Wisdom
The richness of the Framers' debate at the Constitutional Convention is
often lost in modern discussion of alienage jurisdiction. Courts state rather
blandly, in ahistoric fashion, the basic reasons for alienage jurisdiction - to
protect foreign citizens and to avoid foreign entanglements. 64 Commentators
endorsing the maintenance of alienage jurisdiction, in the face of proposed
cutbacks on diversity, have echoed similar themes. The American Law
Institute, for example, has endorsed alienage jurisdiction as a way to avoid
foreign relations difficulties. 65 Similarly, in arguing for retention of
alienage jurisdiction, the Department of State's position has been that "while
the Department has great confidence in the competence, integrity and
impartiality of the state court systems, the availability of civil jurisdiction in
federal courts under a single nationwide system of rules tends to provide a
useful reassurance to foreign governments and their citizens."'
In sum, the commonly expressed rationales for alienage jurisdiction rely
heavily on generic foreign relations concerns and tend to downplay potential
bias against noncitizens in the state courts. A focus on such abstractions
avoids impugning the impartiality and competence of the state courts and,
consequently, is politically palatable. What generally is ignored is that,
163. See FRIENDLY, supra note 20, at 141 (arguing for abolition of diversity jurisdiction and
emphasizing that "there is simply no analogy between today's situation and that existing in 1789").
164. For a textbook example of the standard explanation, see, for example, Blair Holdings Corp.
v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (referring to "[flailure on the part of the individual
states to give protection to foreigners under treaties" and "[aipprehension of entanglements with other
sovereigns that might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level"
(citations omitted)); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Van der Schelling
v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756, 758-60 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd per curian, 324
F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 906 (1964).
165. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 108 (1969). The ALI's position was as follows:
It is important in the relations of this country with other nations that any possible appearance
of injustice or tenable ground for resentment be avoided. This objective can best be achieved
by giving the foreigner the assurance that he can have his cases tried in a court with the best
procedures the federal government can supply and with the dignity and prestige of the United
States behind it.
Id.
166. Letter from Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department
of State, to Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Cts., Civil Liberties and the
Admin. of Just., House of Representatives (Apr. 2, 19,82), in Hearing before the Subconmr. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Adnin. of Justice of the Coimn. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 336 (1982);
see Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 15, at 92 (articulating similar concerns for alienage jurisdiction).
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although the Framers did indeed fear foreign entanglements, other
considerations greatly influenced their thinking about alienage jurisdiction.
This rich history has unfortunately been glossed over in the textbook
explanation of alienage jurisdiction. The next sections will consider, in light
of that history, whether. alienage jurisdiction is necessary today.
B. A Typology of Noncitizens: A Continuum of Bias?
In considering the modern need for alienage jurisdiction, we must
consider the distinct categories of noncitizens, individuals, and entities who
might be eligible for alienage jurisdiction. One might read the debates over
Article III and the Framers' economic concerns as suggesting that the primary
reason for alienage jurisdiction was to protect noncitizens' doing business in
the United States in hopes of encouraging foreigners to engage in further
commerce. At the same time, however, a more general desire was to avoid
foreign entanglements that might result if a foreign government believed that
one of its citizens had been unfairly treated." 7 Neither Article I nor
section 1332 (except for the 1988 amendment singling out lawful permanent
residents 6') limits the application of alienage jurisdiction to any particular
noncitizen group. They instead establish categorical rules for the invocation
of alienagejurisdiction. This decision is entirely justifiable because each of the
various categories of noncitizens, though perhaps to a different degree,
deserves the protection of alienage jurisdiction.
Consider five different categories of noncitizens whose presence as a
party in a lawsuit might give rise to alienage jurisdiction:
1. corporations and business associations organized under the laws of a
nation other than the United States or of the several states; 6 9
2. foreign citizens not physically present in the United States;
3. foreign citizens who are lawful permanent residents of the United
States 70 or legally reside in the country indefinitely under some other legal
167. See, e.g., [MExicAN] NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATION S OF MExICAN MIGRATORY WORKERS ON ROUTE TO THE NORTHERN BORDER AND UPON
ENTERING THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES BORDER STRIP 52-66 (1991) (report of Mexican governmental
agency documenting abuses of Mexican citizens by U.S. immigration authorities). In the 1990s, Mexican
diplomats harshly criticized so-called immigrant bashing by politicians in the United States. See James
Risen, Mexican Envoy Claims U.S. Candidates Exploit Voters'Fears, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at All;
Marc Sandalow, Mexican Envoy Berates State on bnmigration, S.F. CHRON., July 6, 1994, at Al; Mark
Shaffer, Mexico Fears U.S. Racism; Cites 'Anti-limnigrant Climate', ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 27, 1994, at
Al. In particular, the Mexican government objected to the campaign over Proposition 187, an initiative
passed by the California voters in November 1994 that denies a variety of public benefits to undocumented
immigrants. See Tim Golden, The 1994 Campaign: Mexico; Govemnent Joins Attack on Ballot Idea, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A29 (reporting that Mexican president decried campaign over Proposition 187
as "xenophobic"); see also Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Itmnigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629 (1995) (analyzing how Proposition 187 campaign focused on illegal immigration from Mexico and
discussing prevalence of nativist themes in campaign).
168. See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing amendment).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 105-14 (discussing § 1332(c)'s applicability to foreign
corporations).
170. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (explaining definition of lawful permanent




4. legal nonimmigrants 71 physically present in the United States such
as visitors and foreign business people, students, scholars and employers; and
5. undocumented immigrants." n
The first two categories may have been the ones at the forefront of the
Framers' minds in crafting the alienage provisions of Article III. Absent
foreigners who are not part of the United States political community though
they may have transacted business in, or have some other connection with, the
United States, are likely candidates for discrimination. Due to technological
advances, especially transportation improvements, and the increasing
globalization of markets, one would expect that this group of foreigners is
much larger today than it was in the late 1700s.
Many foreign corporations and business associations have fears similar
to those of their British predecessors. This may be true even for a foreign
entity doing significant business in the United States.173 If they perceive
themselves to be treated unfairly in some way, foreign businesses in some
industries may be able to wreak havoc on domestic interests.174 For
example, significant litigation involving Honda Motor Company, a major
Japanese corporation, might affect the often sensitive United States-Japan
trade relations. 75
The third category, lawful immigrants to the United States who are not
naturalized, is directly affected by the recent amendments to section 1332(a),
deeming certain lawful permanent residents to be state citizens. 176 One might
argue that, because these aliens permanently reside in the country, they should
not be eligible for alienage jurisdiction." 7 Potential foreign policy
171. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988); see also
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 230-31 (table listing numerous nonimmigrant visa categories under
immigration laws).
172. See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 270-339 (describing scope of
undocumented immigration to United States). The Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated that,
as of October 1992, there were approximately 3.4 million undocumented immigrants in the United States.
See ROBERT WARREN, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND STATE OF
RESIDENCE: OCTOBER 1992, at 13 (1994) [hereinafter INS STATISTICS].
173. See infra text accompanying notes 261-63 (offering example of animosity in United States
toward Japanese automobile manufacturers).
174. Examples include acts by Arab oil companies in the 1970s and Japanese automobile
manufacturers in the 1980s. See infra text accompanying note 258.
175. See Kelly McParland, U.S., Japan Face Off Today OverAutomobile Tariffs, FIN. POST, June
8, 1995, at 11 (reporting holding of public hearing on possible U.S. trade sanctions against Japanese
automobile manufacturers); James Sterngold, U.S.-Japan Talks Near Make-or-Break Deadline, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1994, at D3 (describing tense U.S.-Japanese trade talks); see also Tasuko Asano, The
U.S. and Japan: A Continuing Special Relationship, 1 WILLAMETrE BULL. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37 (1993)
(describing from Japanese perspective tensions at highest levels of U.S. and Japanese governments
resulting from trade issues between nations).
176. Note that I have not included separately categorized dual citizens, who generally are ineligible
for alienage jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52 (analyzing current treatment of dual
citizens for alienage purposes). Rather, the focus here is on immigrants who are not naturalized citizens.
However, as argued supra text accompanying note 152, discrimination against dual citizens is not difficult
to imagine.
177. This appears to be the rationale behind the 1988 amendment to § 1332, deeming lawful
permanent residents domiciled in a state to be citizens of that state. See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing
impact of amendment).
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consequences might appear more remote in disputes involving this category
of immigrants than for others. Other nations have protested the treatment of
lawful permanent residents by the United States.'17  Moreover, history has
shown that some of the most potent anti-alien sentiment has been directed at
lawful immigrants.' 79 Consequently, lawful permanent residents need the
protection of alienage jurisdiction.
The fourth category involves noncitizens curiously referred to in the
immigration laws as nonimmigrants, that is, persons who may temporarily
stay in the country.' 80 Foreign students, tourists, and business persons, to
offer a few examples, may lawfully enter the nation on a temporary basis.' t
Some nonimmigrant visas effectively allow the noncitizen to remain
indefinitely in the country." 2 Similar to other noncitizens, nonimmigrants
may be subject to antiforeign sentiment,'83 in no small part because they
generally owe allegiances to their native countries to which they have declared
an intention to return.'" The perception of mistreatment of these full
fledged foreign citizens by the state courts could lead to precisely the types
of adverse foreign relations consequences that the Framers feared so much.
The fifth category of persons, undocumented immigrants, has either
entered the nation surreptitiously or has violated the terms of an immigrant or
nonimmigrant visa." 5 A strong argument could be made that, if involved in
a dispute, undocumented persons need the protection of an impartial federal
forum in light of the history of their unpopularity, exploitation, and
178. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 655-56 & n.7 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(acknowledging Japanese government's hostile response to passage of California's alien land law directed
at Japanese in United States); supra note 167 (describing Mexican government's negative response to
California's Proposition 187).
179. See infra Part IV.C.
180. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1988); see also
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 230-31 (table listing numerous nonimmigrant visa categories under
immigration laws).
181. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(B) (business and tourist visa), (F)
(student visa), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B),(F) (1988).
182. For example, treaty traders and treaty investors in theory are temporary sojourners in this
country but in practice may stay indefinitely. See Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(E), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(E) (1988); see also Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald,
C.J.) (observing that, for this type of nonimmigrant visa, "extensions are routinely granted and [treaty
trader and investor] status is therefore considered nearly as desirable as permanent resident status"
(footnote omitted)).
183. See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cen. denied, 446 U.S. 957
(1980) (upholding presidential order that all Iranian students in United States report to Immigration and
Naturalization Service and demonstrate lawful presence in country); 56 Fed. Reg. 1566 (1991) (mandating
photographing and fingerprinting of nonimmigrants bearing Iraqi and Kuwaiti travel documents before
being allowed to enter country in response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).
184. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1988)
(defining business or tourist nonimmigrant as "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no
intention of abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for
pleasure").
185. See generally ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 270-339 (discussing parameters of
undocumented immigration to United States). The INS estimates that, as of October 1992, about one half
of the undocumented population in this country entered without inspection while the other half, known as
visa overstays, entered on a valid visa but remained in the country in violation of its terms. See INS
STATISTICS, supra note 172, at 16-17. Because of the legal vulnerability, including the threat of
deportation, of undocumented persons, it would seem unlikely that they as a group would bring many
alienage cases in federal court.
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vulnerability in this nation. 86 This argument carries particular force for
some groups of undocumented persons. For example, undocumented persons
from Mexico who comprise a significant percentage of the total undocumented
population,8 7 may be viewed most unfavorably by the public at large.'88
Foreign governments, including Mexico's, have been known to protest the
treatment of undocumented persons by the state and federal governments.8 9
In sum, aliens of each type described face the distinct possibility that
nativist sentiment may influence their treatment in the state and federal courts.
Although some differences between the groups in terms of the degree of
resentment might be expected, the fact that they are noncitizens almost
guarantees the likelihood that they will suffer some.
C. Recurring Xenophobia in the United States
This section offers evidence to support the assertion that nativism persists
in the United States. Recurring surges of nativism and xenophobia have
plagued this nation's history and suggest the potential for unfair treatment of
noncitizens in the courts. Bias against noncitizens unfortunately remains to this
day. Many of the reasons for alienage jurisdiction offered by the Framers of
the Constitution apply as much today as they did over two hundred years ago.
For example, the appearance of partiality in the adjudication of the disputes
of foreign citizens or businesses may adversely impact foreign commerce and
186. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the limnigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and lumnigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1230-34 [hereinafter
Johnson, Los Olvidados] (discussing political insulation of undocumented aliens). A recent example is
California's Proposition 187, a measure designed to reduce public benefits available to undocumented
persons that the voters of the state passed by a 59-41% margin. See Johnson, supra note 167, at 650-61
(analyzing racist undertones to Proposition 187 campaign); Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and
imnigration: The Intersection of limnigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV.
1509, 1568-74 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Public Benefits] (analyzing impacts of initiative, if
implemented, on various subgroups of undocumented community).
187. See INS STATISTICS, supra note 172, at 14 (estimating that 39% of total undocumented
population in United States is from Mexico).
188. See Johnson, supra note 167 (analyzing anti-Mexican sentiment in Proposition 187 campaign,
which on its face was directed at undocumented persons).
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (citing authorities). As the Supreme Court observed
in holding that the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act (requiring certain aliens to register with the state)
was preempted by federal law:
One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships ... has to do with
the protection of the just rights of a country's own nationals when those nationals are in
another country. Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest nioment,
sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects
inflicted, or permitted, by a government. This country, like other nations, has entered into
numerous treaties of amity and commerce since its inception - treaties entered into under
express constitutional authority, and binding upon the states as well as the nation. Among
those treaties have been many which not only promised and guaranteed broad rights and
privileges to aliens sojourning in our own territory, but secured reciprocal promise and
guaranteed for our own citizens while in other lands. And apart from treaty obligations, there
has grown up in the field of international relations a body of customs defining with more or
less certainty the duties owing by all nations to alien residents - duties which our State
Department has often successfully insisted foreign nations must recognize as to our nationals
abroad. In general, both treaties and internationabpractices have been aimed at preventing
injurious discriminations against aliens.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1941) (footnotes omitted).
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the nation as a whole.' 9° Additionally, other reasons apart from those
articulated by the Framers, most prominently the nation's enduring
commitment to equal protection of the laws, justify retaining alienage
jurisdiction.
Developments in the early 1990s attest'' to the persistence of the
sporadic outbursts of antiforeign sentiment in the United States. 92 These
sentiments have sometimes resulted from foreign relations tensions, especially
in time of war. Xenophobia can also be directly traced to the influx of new
immigrants to the United States.
Events shortly after the Constitutional Convention confirmed the Framers'
diagnosis of the need for alienage jurisdiction. The Fifth Congress (1797-99),
responding to a fear of foreign political influence in the United States
combined with severely strained relations with France, passed three patently
xenophobic acts known infamously as the Alien and Sedition Acts.' These
acts were nothing more than thinly veiled Federalist attempts to halt the
growing political power of the Republicans, spurred on by their increasing
popularity among new immigrants.' 94 Specifically, the Naturalization Act
increased from five to fifteen years the residency requirement for
naturalization,'' which of course delayed immigrant participation in the
political process. 9 ' The Aliens Act and the Alien Enemy Act gave the
President unfettered discretion to deport any alien considered dangerous to the
national welfare.' 97
These laws were not the only early indications of the nation's potential
for antiforeign sentiment. Similar to the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812
provoked a resurgence of American animosity toward the British. 98 This
marked the beginning of a pattern in the United States, i.e., waves of
antiforeign sentiment would spread across the nation during times of war.
190. Cf. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2289-90 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (recounting objections by U.S. trading partners to California tax
scheme and fear that it might "deter[] foreign investment" in United States).
191. See Johnson, Los Olvidados, supra note 186, at 1162-74 (recounting growth of nativist
sentiment in United States in 1990s).
192. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing history of
nativism in United States).
193. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956); JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION ACTS (1951).
194. See HIGHAM, supra note 192, at 8; EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at 12-16 (1981); JONES, supra note 71, at 72-75; KENNETH
L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 86-87 (1989); SELECT
COMM'N ON IMMIG. AND REFUGEE POL'Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
STAFF REPORT 167-68 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP, STAFF REPORT].
195. 1 Stat. 566 (1798).
196. See SMITH, supra note 193, at 23 ("The Naturalization Act of 1798 ... was a political
maneuver by the Federalists designed to cut off an increasingly important source of Republican strength.").
See generally MILLER, supra note 193, at 39-54 (describing political dynamics culminating in Alien and
Sedition Acts).
197. See 1 Stat. 570 (1798); 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
198. See BRADFORD PERKINS, CASTLEREAGH AND ADAMS: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES,
1812-1823, at 173-95 (1964).
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Virulent hatred in the United States for Germans during World War I'll and
the Japanese during World War 11° are prime examples of this tendency.
The antiforeign sentiment accompanying the wars led to adverse treatment of
Germans and Japanese in the United States, of which the internment of the
Japanese is the most extreme example.
War has hardly been the only circumstance in which antiforeign fervor
has erupted. Historically, more generalized national security concerns also
have motivated antiforeign outbursts. The Alien and Sedition Acts were an
early indicia of this nation's tendency to blame noncitizens for domestic
troubles. Similarly, the Red Scare in the 1920s2 °l and the reign of
McCarthyism in the 1950s exhibited deep, almost paranoid, suspicion of
anything foreign."ea Concern with international terrorism also has provoked
antiforeign sentiment in the latter part of the twentieth century.03
Numerous xenophobic epochs, such as the anti-British feeling so prevalent
at the time of the framing of the Constitution, had economic roots. 2 4 In the
mid-nineteenth century, on the heels of heavy Catholic immigration from
Ireland and Germany, the xenophobic Know-Nothing Party entered the
national political scene and claimed that immigrants were the cause of a
variety of economic and social ills.2'5 Violent and undisputedly racist anti-
Chinese sentiment, which largely coincided with a national economic
downturn in the late 1800s is another infamous xenophobic chapter of this
nation's history.Y
As many of these examples suggest, the fear of foreigners in the United
States historically has adversely affected people from other nations, sometimes
even those perceived to be "foreign" because of their physical characteristics.
199. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting the teaching
of German in schools); see also KARST, supra note 194, at 84 ("The campaign for the Americanization
of foreigners, which gained intensity during World War I and culminated in the mania of the Red Scare
of 1919-20, was the most determined national effort to coerce conformity to the values and behavior of
the dominant culture.").
200. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-42 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that persons of Japanese ancestry were interned during World War II because of prejudice).
201. See generally EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER RAIDS 1919-20: AN ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS
DISSENT (1969) (recounting raids during Red Scare resulting in deportation of alleged subversives, many
of whom were active in leftist labor organizations); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS 208-
37 (1963) (same).
202. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that,
based on confidential information, alien could be excluded and indefinitely detained without hearing);
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (authorizing exclusion of alien without
hearing for national security reasons); see also Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, Nylon Curtain:
America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 749-65 (1985)
(describing various restrictions on flow of ideas into and out of United States). See generally Charles D.
Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995) (analyzing plenary power doctrine as applied in Mezei and Knauffi.
203. See, e.g., Mary B. Tabor, Specter of Terror: U.S. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as Head of Group
Plotting 'War of Urban Terrorism', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993 (reporting indictment of asylum applicant
for involvement in World Trade Center bombing in New York City).
204. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 192 (studying various periods of anti-immigrant sentiment
in United States and linking them to economic and other social tensions).
205. See SCIRP, STAFF REPORT, supra note 194. at 170-76; CARL WITTKE, WE WHO BUILT
AMERICA 497-510 (1939).
206. See generally RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF
ASIAN AMERICANS 79-131 (1989) (recounting harsh treatment of Chinese).
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As xenophobia increased in response to World War I, some states
disenfranchised noncitizens who previously had been afforded the right to
vote.2 7 As exemplified by the national origin discrimination that has long
troubled the country, xenophobic fervor has had a general impact on citizens
as well as lawful permanent residents.2"8 In addition, Congress has
responded to nativist outbursts by passing restrictionist immigration laws.2"
Until 1965, national origin quotas in those laws favored immigration from
northern and western Europe and severely limited immigration from many
developing nations.2"0 The lifting of these quotas in 1965 has brought with
it increasing concern with the "foreignness" of immigrants to the United
States.21'
A possible side effect of antiforeign sentiment that generally goes ignored
is the inability of noncitizens to obtain a fair trial in the United States.2"2
Judges and juries may be influenced by patently xenophobic views or more
subtle antiforeign tendencies in deciding cases involving noncitizens. The
threat is particularly acute because noncitizens generally are barred from
serving on juries. With very few exceptions, noncitizens currently cannot
vote2 3 and are prohibited from jury service. 2 '4 This is as true for the
lawful permanent resident who has lived in the nation for fifty years as it is
for the undocumented person who entered the country yesterday.
Subtle bias against foreigners in the adjudicatory process can be seen even
in some rather mundane procedural law. For example, in the law of venue,
although citizens are afforded very specific protections with respect to where
they can be sued,215 Congress specifically provided that "[a]n alien may be
sued in any district" in the United States. 26 This section applies to a lawful
207. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1403-04, 1415-16 (1993).
208. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994); see, e.g., Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of
Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming finding of national origin discrimination against
naturalized citizen born in Philippines); see also Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239,
240-41 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for employer in case in which supervisor referred
to employee originally from Mexico as "wetback"); Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming finding that Filipino with accent was not discriminated against on basis of
national origin), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990).
209. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES
IN IMMIGRATION 7-12 (1980).
210. See infra text accompanying notes 235-37.
211. See generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION (1995) (expressing concern with racial
composition of immigrant stream).
212. Two well known examples where nativism, combined with other factors, may have affected
the outcome of legal proceedings are the trials of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti. See FRANCIS RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM: THE STORY OF THE SACCO-
VANZETrI CASE 73 (1971) (mentioning that two radicals, ultimately convicted of murder, had immigrated
to United States and spoke little English); JOHN WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS AND ETHEL
ROSENBERG 104, 248 (1955) (noting that Julius Rosenberg was son of immigrants, as well as Rosenbergs'
concern that anti-Semitism would affect trial).
213. See Raskin, supra note 207, at 1394.
214. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1988) (making citizenship requirement for federal jury
duty).
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a),(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1988) (emphasis added). Because of the operation of § 1391(d), for
example, aliens are denied the protection of specific venue rules for patent infringement actions. See
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permanent resident domiciled in a particular state, who is, ironically enough,
treated as a citizen of that state for alienage purposes.1 7 For venue
purposes, such a noncitizen can be sued in any district; a citizen in a diversity
case ordinarily may be sued only where the defendants in the case reside or
where a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred. "21' The assumption apparently underlying the section is that, for
an alien, suit in any district in the United States is just as convenient as any
other. This obviously is not always the case. Lawful permanent residents, like
other noncitizens, are therefore denied concrete benefits offered resident
citizens under the venue statute.
219
Despite the intuition that judges and juries may be influenced by
antiforeign bias, empirical data demonstrating such bias in the state or federal
courts is difficult to come by, and the inferences to be drawn from the
available data are subject to dispute.' Specifically, a comparison of
judgments in state and federal court actions involving aliens might shed light
on the need for alienage jurisdiction." Such information, however, is not
readily available. Nonetheless, the existence of antiforeign views in the
general public, and the influence of such views on the political process, is
difficult to question. One would be surprised if such views did not somehow
influence the adjudicatory process. 2 Consequently, there is every reason
to believe that antiforeign sentiment has some effect on juries and politically
accountable judges.
In deciding on the need for alienage jurisdiction, one must compare the
potential for bias against noncitizens in the state and federal courts: It is
Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 708-11 (1972); In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653,
662 (1893). Although § 1391(d) was not added to the Judicial Code until 1948, it confirmed longstanding
practice. See Brunette Mach. Works, 406 U.S. at 708-11 (summarizing history).
217. See supra Part III.A.2.
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), (2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
219. See Andrew Berger, Alien Venue: Neither Necessary Nor Constitutional, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 155, 173-76 (1976). Another more subtle example is that at times, the Supreme Court, while
condoning "forum shopping" by domestic plaintiffs, has not been so generous with respect to foreign
plaintiffs doing the same. Compare Keeton v. Hustler Mag. Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (observing
that domestic plaintiff's "successful search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no different
from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or
procedural rules or sympathetic local populations") with Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252
& n.18 (1981) (dismissing personal injury action brought by noncitizen plaintiff onforun non conveniens
grounds and describing U.S. courts as "extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs" who might "further
congest already crowded courts").
220. Cf. FCSC, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 22, at 451 (citing authorities mentioning difficulties
in empirically verifying need for diversity jurisdiction). One empirical study focuses on the final
dispositions of alienage cases in the federal courts. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARv. L. REV. _ (forthcoming Mar. 1996). The data in that study
suggests that alien parties generally fare better than domestic parties in federal court. The study, however,
does not include comparable state court data. The lack of such data makes any inferences about the relative
biases of the two fora hazardous at best. In addition, the database in that study did not account for
settlements in determining "winners" and "losers." One would expect cases that settle to differ in salient
ways from ones that proceed to trial. For example, it is foreseeable that cases that settle might have a
higher incidence of xenophobic bias than those that go to trial.
221. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) (arguing that question of whether state courts equal federal courts in protecting
federal rights is empirical question for which definitive nswer is not likely)
222. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (analyzing often unconscious nature of racism).
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noteworthy that the state governments historically have exhibited greater
hostility toward "foreigners" than the federal government. For example, the
federal Chinese exclusion laws of the nineteenth century followed decades of
political agitation accompanied by passionate debate, violence, and legislation
directed at the Chinese on the West Coast, especially in California.'
Antiforeign hostility historically has been most virulent at the state and local
levels, as exemplified by Proposition 187, an initiative aimed at illegal aliens
passed by California voters.224 In essence, the strength of such sentiment
often is greater at the regional than at the national level. This is not surprising
in light of the fact that foreign persons and businesses tend to concentrate in
certain localities for geographical and other reasons.
Currently, an alien in a civil action generally may avail himself of a
federal forum through filing, or the removal of, a suit involving a United
States citizen. Consequently, one would expect to find it difficult to find
examples of anti-alien bias in the state courts. One civil case barred from the
federal courts because the dispute involved exclusively aliens,2 -s however,
demonstrates the potential for antiforeign bias to influence the proceedings.
In Haryanto v. Saeed,"6 a jury awarded $1 million in compensatory and $2
million in punitive damages to an alien hotel employee from Pakistan who had
sued an Indonesian hotel guest for false imprisonment, assault, and related
torts. In closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff repeatedly emphasized the
foreign nationality of the defendant and played on nativist themes:
In some places the very rich are almost like God. They can do anything they want. Mr.
Soerono Haryanto thinks he is that kind of person, and he thinks America is that kind of
place.... You have the opportunity to emphasize what America standsfor .... [Ius it a
place where we should allow someone from Singapore or Indonesia or the Philippines, or
whatever this man is, to come over and say, 'When I'm here, slavery is fine: and 1fI say
to kiss my feet and if I say I will kill you, ifI have the right to terrorize you for a period
of time, it's fine for who I am?'... He is thumbing his nose at you, at this process, at this
country... You need to send a message not just to Soerono Haryanto in the Philippines
or Singapore or wherever he is hiding out, but to send a message all the way around that
in America you can't do this.... Do something right for the United States of America.m
Rejecting the challenges to this argument, the Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed the jury verdict." Although few examples are so extreme, this is
223. See generally CHARLES J. McCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUoLE
AGAINsT DIscRIMINATIONiN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994) (analyzing various policies and state
and local laws directed at Chinese immigrants and Chinese community's responses).
224. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 254-57 (describing so-called alien land laws passed
by number of states); supra note 186 (discussing Proposition 187 passed by California voters); supra text
accompanying note 143 (mentioning legal impediments placed on lawful permanent residents by states);
cf. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, No. 92-17087, 1995 WL 583414, at *24 (9th Cir. Oct. 5,
1995) (en banc) (invalidating Arizona "English as the Official Language" initiative and emphasizing that
"[s]ince language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of languages
may mask discrimination against specific national origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist
sentiments.") (citations omitted).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
226. 860 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
227. Id. at 927-28 (Robertson, J., dissenting) (quoting closing argument) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
228. See id. at 920.
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not the only evidence of bias against foreigners in state civil rulings.'
Moreover, there is evidence that the states have been harsh on aliens in
criminal matters, which aliens cannot "remove" or otherwise take (at least
initially) to a federal forum. The longstanding antipathy of the states toward
criminal aliensl 0 has manifested itself in the 1990s by states seeking
compensation from the federal government for the costs of incarcerating
criminal aliens and exploring ways to expedite their deportation. 1 Appeals
to antiforeign sentiment sometimes are evident in state criminal proceedings.
For example, state courts have allowed prosecutors broad leeway in
emphasizing to juries that a criminal defendant is foreign." 2 The death
229. See infra Part IV.D (reviewing evidence of bias against foreign business in state civil cases);
see, e.g., Davis v. Glaze, 354 S.E.2d 845, 849 (Ga. 1987) (upholding verdict for plaintiff in negligence
despite fact that plaintiff stated in closing argument that doctor who treated burn was born and educated
in Korea and suffered disadvantage in communicating with English speakers); Hovanesian v. Boyajian,
4 N.E.2d 1006, 1007 (Mass. 1936) (holding that attorney's reference to fact that parties were Armenians
did not require new trial); Reyes v. Arthur Tickle Eng'g Works, 144 N.E.2d 723, 723 (N.Y. 1957)
(affirming verdict for defendants despite fact that defendants' counsel stated that plaintiff's witness was
"Puerto Rican, the same as the plaintiff, and was attempting to help the plaintiff in the case"); Tabet v.
Kaufman, 67 S.W.2d 1072, 1073 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934) (holding that reading of poem during closing
argument about Assyrian invasion of Jerusalem did not justify new trial in civil suit brought by Jewish
plaintiff against Assyrian defendants). However, in one case, a state trial court reversed ajudgment against
a Japanese defendant who had unsuccessfully attempted to remove the case to federal court because
plaintiff's counsel, among other things, said:
[T]hat brings me to the three Japanese. They don't like us because they can't be citizens,
because they can't - they don't like us because they can't even rent land in this state, at least.
And the reason they can't do it is because we don't like their ways of living and we decline
to degrade our people to the plane on which they live, where women and children go out and
dig potatoes and work in a garden to support a family.
Now, it is not at all out of place for me to say Japanese people don't like us, and we
don't like them, because it is just a plain fact that you all know.
Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 1 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1931) (reversing and remanding for new
trial); see Penate v. Berry, 348 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (reversing verdict for defendant
on ground that trial court erroneously overruled objection to following statement about alien plaintiff:
"'you see, it just so happens that in this country you can't come into court and reach your hands into the
pockets of an American citizen and-take his property from him - not for an alien .... '").
230. See Neuman, supra note 72, at 1841-46 (analyzing efforts of states to exclude criminal aliens).
231. See Johnson, Public Benefits, supra note 186, at 1531-34 (describing efforts of this sort). This
is not to suggest that the federal government has not made great strides to penalize criminal aliens. Rather,
the point is that the states have been more aggressive and more antialien on this front. See id.
232. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State 547 So. 2d 582, 589-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (refusing to reverse
convictions of Vietnamese criminal defendants for robbery even though prosecutor's closing argument
referred to "'roving gangs of gunmen holding "em up"'" in Vietnam); Haas v. State, 247 S.E.2d 507,
510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to reverse conviction despite fact that prosecutor referred to "Italian
connection" and stated that defendant was "'Sicilian'"); State v. Andersch, 438 N.E.2d 482, 487 (II1. App.
Ct. 1982) (affirming conviction of German national despite prosecutor's reference during trial to "Atilla
[sic] the Hun, an infamous Germanic figure"); People v. Flores, 398 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 al. App. Ct.
1979) (affirming conviction even though prosecutor stated that defendants were from Puerto Rico and
robbery victim was from Mexico and "[mlaybe there is some animosity there"); Commonwealth v. Alves,
625 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that prosecutor's statement that Brazilian criminal
defendant unlawfully entered United States was not reversible error); People v. Bahoda, 531 N.W.2d 659,
661 (Mich. 1995) (holding that prosecutor's references to "Arab," "Arab connection," and "Iraqi" in trial
during Persian Gulf War did not require new trial for criminal defendant from Iraq); People v. Michigan,
447 N.W.2d 835, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that defendant waived objections to prosecutor's
comment that "'[tihis man comes from the Middle East, and he's not content to make his money from the
gas station. He needs more. He gets into the cocaine, nontaxable income life-style.'"); Missouri v. Pendas,
855 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that criminal defendant waived any challenge to
prosecutor's comment that it was "offensive for people to come into this country from another country and
sell drugs"); State v. Worstell, 767 S.W.2d 352, 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that repeated
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penalty has been imposed on aliens." State prosecutors have employed
peremptory challenges to strike jurors who speak a language other than
English, which one might guess would have a disparate impact on the foreign
born. 4
In analyzing whether alienage jurisdiction should be retained, it is critical
to note that antiforeign sentiment threatens to be a continuing problem in the
United States. Besides growth in international trade, there are other
developing connections between the United States and foreign nations. Though
increasing intercourse between nations might reduce xenophobia, this is not
necessarily the case. Immigration is an example. Many of the aliens in the
country today, as well as immigrants to the country, are people of color, often
from Asian and Latin American nations."3 The demographics of
immigration to the United States have changed drastically since 1965, when
Congress abolished the national origin quota system that operated to preclude
many racial minorities from immigrating to the United States. 6 These new
immigrants, upon establishing domicile in a state, often are ineligible under
current law to invoke alienage jurisdiction. 7 However, these immigrants,
as aliens and as people of color, understandably may have qualms about
whether they will receive fair treatment in the justice system.
The changing demographics of immigration bring us to another rationale
for alienage jurisdiction, one that the Framers did not have in mind in
providing for alienage jurisdiction in Article III but that instead is tied to
modern circumstances and the evolution of constitutional principles. The
potential bias against noncitizens in the state courts raises Fourteenth
Amendment concerns about whether they are receiving equal protection of the
laws." The Supreme Court has consistently held that noncitizens in this
references by prosecutor to fact that defendants were foreign born did not constitute reversible error);
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 595 A.2d 617, 621-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that prosecutor's
references to defendant as "illegal alien" were improper but constituted "harmless error"); Varughese v.
State, 892 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that criminal defendant from India waived any
objection to prosecutor's pronouncements that "this is an American court, the victim was American but
the defendant is not, and generally accentuating the fact that, although Varughese is not a citizen he is
treated like one in the court"). Even though some state appellate courts have reversed convictions based
on improper references to national origin, see, e.g., State v. Torres, 554 P.2d 1069 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976), the frequency of such statements suggests their utility for prosecutors seeking to obtain a
conviction.
233. See, e.g., Honda v. People, 141 P.2d 178, 186 (Colo. 1943) (affirming death penalty imposed
on Japanese defendant during World War II despite prosecutor's comment to jury that conduct of defendant
was "a typical example of oriental treachery"); Guerra v. State, 771 S.W.2d 453, 462-63 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989) (rejecting claim of capital defendant, who was undocumented,
that juror should have been stricken for cause because of evincing bias against "illegal aliens").
234. See, e.g., Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
235. See 1992 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 129, at 21 (presenting statistics reflecting
that nine of top ten nations sending immigrants to United States in fiscal year 1992 were developing
nations populated primarily by people of color).
236. See ALENIKOFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 53-58 (describing national origin quota system
and its elimination from immigration laws in 1965); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and
Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 326-30 (1993) (analyzing impact of elimination of national
origin quotas).
237. See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing 1988 amendment to § 1332(a) that deems lawful permanent
residents to be citizens of state in which they are domiciled).
238. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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country merit the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Modern equal protection doctrine has been concerned with
the protection of discrete and insular minorities.2 ° To realize this equal
protection guarantee in the adjudication of disputes involving noncitizens,
procedural devices such as alienage jurisdiction are necessary. An equal
protection type of justification for alienage jurisdiction, is bolstered by the fact
that, since 1965, immigrants increasingly have been people of color.241
Indeed, a respectable argument could be made that, even without Article im,
Congress could provide for alienage jurisdiction to protect against invidious
discrimination against noncitizens.
242
D. Alienage Jurisdiction and International Trade
The Framers of the Constitution viewed alienage jurisdiction as one way
of encouraging foreign investment in the United States. Bias against foreign
(i.e., British) creditors in the state courts contributed to the call at the
Constitutional Convention for affording the national courts the jurisdiction to
resolve disputes involving noncitizens. The potential for antiforeign bias in the
modern commercial world is relevant in evaluating the continuing need for
alienage jurisdiction.
It is difficult to verify bias against foreign business in the adjudicatory
process. However, I would be surprised if the antipathy toward foreign
business historically visible in'the political process failed to influence the
adjudicatory processes in the United States. This section will consider some
of the history of antiforeign business sentiment and assess the economic
benefits of alienage jurisdiction.
1. Domestic Anxiety over Foreign Capital
As part of the animosity toward the British in the 1700s suggests,
antiforeign sentiment often has been connected to foreign commerce in the
United States.2 3 Objections have been made about the influence of
"foreigners" on the domestic economy, as well as about foreign business
practices, at various intervals in U.S. history. Consequently, foreign
commercial activities have been subject to a vast array of regulation and
239. See TRIBE, supra note 142, § 16-23, at 1544-53 (recounting decisions).
240. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989); United States v..
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
242. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (providing that Congress has power to enact legislation
to enforce dictates of Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, Congress arguably could rely on this constitutional
authorization to allow federal jurisdiction over a dispute in which any alien was a party, including suits
between two aliens, which the Supreme Court has held are not permitted by Article III. See supra text
accompanying notes 153-55;
243. See generally MIRA WILKINs, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INvESTMENT IN THE UNrED STATES
TO 1914, at 556-607 (1989) (chronicling history of often negative responses to foreign investment in
United States).
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restriction.'" Perhaps the most serious concern expressed is that foreign
capital dominates the American economy.245
The political process has responded to domestic concerns about foreign
capital.2" A few examples should suffice to illustrate this phenomenon.
Increasing state and federal interest in regulating and monitoring foreign
investment has occurred in the recent past.247 Concerns of a similar nature
have been expressed about foreign influence in the United States, as evidenced
by the passage of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,24 which regulates
the lobbying activities of foreign agents;249 section 310(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934 ,so which restricts foreign ownership of radio
stations and broadcast television;"5  and the Exon-Florio amendment, 2
which "grants the President discretionary authority to block, for national
security reasons, mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers which would result in
244. See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 51-53, 63-66 (4th ed.
1994) (describing state and federal control of economic activities of aliens); Detlev F. Vagts, The
Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1489 (1961) (analyzing federal restraints on commercial activity of aliens from 1789 to 1961); see also
Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny
for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 Mo. L. REV. 569 (1994) (arguing that based on history of
discrimination against foreign corporations in United States, heightened scrutiny of regulation of such
corporations is justified).
245. See generally NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS:
How FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY (1989) (analyzing impact of foreign
investment on U.S. economy); MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How
FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION (1988) (same). This is not to suggest that
concern with foreign investment is exclusively motivated by an invidious intent. See FRED L. MORRISON
& KENNETH R. KRAUSE, STATE AND FEDERAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ALIEN AND CORPORATE LAND
OWNERSHIP AND FARM OPERATION 59-60 (1975) (summarizing arguments for and against regulation of
foreign ownership of farm land).
246. See STEINERET AL., supra note 244, at 70-73 (discussing changes in attitudes in United States
toward foreign investment and impact on legislation).
247. See Richard L. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-OwnedReal Estate,
71 GEO. L.J. 1091, 1092-93 (1983) (describing concern with foreign investment in 1970s); Cheryl Tate,
Note, The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investment in the United States, 99 YALE
L.J. 2023, 2025-32 (1990) (summarizing attempts by states to regulate foreign investment). For a
somewhat dated sampling of the types of governmental regulation of foreign investment in the United
States, see Paul McCarthy, Government Regulation of Foreign Investment, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (Daniel M. Evans et al. eds., 1976).
248. Pub. L. No. 75-593, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1988)).
249. See Michael I. Spak, Americafor Sale: When Well-ConnectedFormer Federal Officials Peddle
Their Influence to the Highest Foreign Bidder - A Statutory Analysis and Proposals for Reform of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Ethics in Government Act, 78 KY. L.J. 237, 237-42 (1989-90);
see also Rodney A. Smolla & Stephen A. Smith, Propaganda, Xenophobia, and the First Amendment, 67
OR. L. REV. 253, 255 (1988) (contending that Supreme Court's interpretation of Foreign Agents
Registration Act in Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), "capitulates to a recurring weakness in
American culture, a reflexive xenophobic tendency to paternalistically shelter Americans from 'foreign'
or 'alien' speech"). For an extended discussion of the allegedly untoward influence of Japanese lobbyists
on the U.S. political process, see PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE (1990).
250. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1988).
251. See John J. Watkins, Alien Ownership and the Communications Act, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 1
(1981); Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Foreigners from Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the
Global Information Highway, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1188 (1995); see e.g., Moving Phones Partnership v.
FCC, 998 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying §'310(b)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994).
252. Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1425
(Supp. IV 1992).
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'foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce. ' 2s3
Concern with foreign business frequently has been strongest at the state
and local levels. The lengthy history of regulation by the states of alien land
ownership typifies the longstanding popular concern with foreign control of
domestic resources, as well as the influence of xenophobia and racism.'
In the early 1900s, for example, California passed a law directed at the
Japanese that prohibited the ownership of farmland by certain aliens.Y As
of 1993, almost half of the states had laws restricting the rights of aliens to
own certain real property, although most are limited to nonresident aliens and
foreign businesses." Economic, as well as xenophobic and racial,
considerations certainly factored into the political dynamics culminating in the
passage of the alien land laws.'sl
Other examples of antiforeign sentiment directed at foreign business
abound. So-called Arab oil money in the 1970s and the Japanese "invasion"
of the economy in the 1980s triggered hysterical reactions from some
commentators.s Though more subtle, the debate over whether Congress
should ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) resonated
with a distinctively negative view of Mexican capital (e.g., it exploits labor,
pollutes the environment, etc.) and labor (e.g., it works for too little money).
In opposing NAFTA, as well as in his 1992 run for the presidency, Ross
Perot decried the influence of foreign lobbyists on the political process."
These examples again illustrate that nativism frequently is linked with
253. Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and the United States International Investment
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1989) (footnote omitted).
254. See Fred L. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN.
L. REV. 621, 623-29 (1976); Charles H. Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15
(1962). Interestingly, during the American Revolution, Virginia passed a law barring British ownership
of land. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in LIFE OF JEFFERSON, supra note 48, at 271-72.
255. See generally Edwin E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 35 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1947) (arguing that land law was enacted to discriminate against
Japanese and violated Fourteenth Amendment); Dudley 0. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of
California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947) (examining laws of eleven states that
discriminated against aliens who were ineligible for naturalization because of race). For a cogent and lucid
summary of the campaign resulting in the passage of California's alien land law by initiative in 1920, see
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 658-62 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring).
256. See Mark Shapiro, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Limit on Alien Land Laws, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 217, 223-24 (1993) (cataloging various state laws on alien land ownership).
257. See TAKAKI, supra note 206, at 203-07 (discussing impacts of alien land laws in California
on Japanese farmers).
258. See, e.g., KENNETH C. CROWE, AMERICA FOR SALE 3 (1978) ("Is America for sale? The
simple answer is yes! America is for sale, in bits and pieces and large chunks - its stocks and bonds, its
companies and real estate, its ideas and individuals .... [Niever before have the buyers come in such
large numbers from so many diverse parts of the earth. The buyers are the nouveau-riche Arabs, imperial
Iran, the busy Japanese [and many other nations]."); EARL H. FRY, FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A.:
A THREAT TO AMERICAN SOCIETY? 146-47 (1980) (stating that "veritable flood of foreign-controlled
money has recently inundated the American marketplace, a financial onslaught which is gathering
momentum with each passing year" and cautioning that "U.S. authorities must ... be vigilant and begin
to effectively monitor foreign investment").
259. See Ross PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA
MusT BE STOPPED - Now! 59-63 (1993) (decrying Mexican lobbying efforts seeking U.S. ratification
of trade pact); Kevin Sack, The 1992 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at A22 (quoting Perot:
"'You've got two [presidential] candidates who were lunded and paid for by PAC money, foreign
lobbyists, and special interests.'").
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economic considerations.26°
2. The Commercial Benefits of Alienage Jurisdiction
Because foreign business has had access to the federal courts for over two
hundred years, one would be surprised to find definitive evidence of bias
against it in the state courts. A noncitizen can bring suit in federal court or,
as a defendant, remove to federal court a suit filed in state court. Foreign
businesses, with generally more sophistication and resources than individual
foreign litigants, presumably are more likely to use such procedural devices.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that foreign corporations find it difficult to
avoid the influence of nativism in the state courts, though it is difficult to
determine whether the bias is against foreign corporations, corporations
generally, or a mix of both.
Consider a few cases against foreign businesses that made their way to
the United States Supreme Court. A jury in an Oregon state court found
Honda Motor Company, a Japanese corporation, liable for punitive damages
of five million dollars, five times the compensatory damages award, in a
products liability action.26' In arguing for reversal, Honda argued that bias
against corporate the defendants is particularly likely when defendant is a
"well-known foreign-owned corporation" and complained that the jury "was
not told to disregard Honda's status as a foreign-owned company. 2 62 The
Supreme Court acknowledged this potential and stated that, in cases involving
punitive damages, "presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates
the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
business, particularly those without a strong local presence."
2 63
Similarly, the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in excess of $1
260. It is often difficult to isolate xenophobia directed at foreign business from that focused on
noncitizens generally. A notorious example was a Chinese-American beaten to death with a baseball bat
by two unemployed U.S. autoworkers who apparently blamed their unemployment on Japanese competition
in the automobile market. See United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427 (6th Cir. 1986); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTs, CIVIL RIGHTs IssuEs FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE 1990s 25-26 (1992).
Evidence at the trial of one of the defendants described the initial encounter as follows:
Ebens began making racial and obscene remarks toward Chin calling him a "Chink" and a
"Nip" and making remarks about foreign car imports. It is apparent that Ebens seemed to
believe that Chin was Japanese and he was quoted as having made the further comment that
"it's because of you little mother flickers that we're out of work."
Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427. Violence has also been aimed directly at noncitizens who operate small
businesses. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 32-41 (offering examples, including harassment
of Korean grocers and Vietnamese fishermen); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and
Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an linmigration-Driven
Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863, 888-89 (1993) (analyzing economic, as well as racial, conflict
between Korean American business and African Americans in south central Los Angeles).
261. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (1994).
262. See Brief for Petitioners at 26, 32, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (No.
93-644); see also Brief for Amici Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (No. 93-644) (arguing that due process mandated judicial review ofjuries' punitive
damage awards because of, inter alia, possibility of prejudice against foreign defendants).
263. Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (emphasis added); see also BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994) (affirming jury award of $4 million in punitive damages against German
automobile manufacturer and American distributor, sum that was 1000 times compensatory damages award
of $4,000, on condition that punitive damage awards be reduced to $2 million), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
932 (1995).
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million against a foreign defendant in a tort suit based on a helicopter accident
that occurred in Peru.2  In that case, the foreign defendant claimed that the
Texas Supreme Court applied a more liberal test of personal jurisdiction
because the company was foreign. 5 Thus, the concern was not simply
antiforeign sentiment by the jury but bias in the highest court of a state.
More generally, charges have been made that jurors are biased against
foreign corporations.266 The influence of xenophobia on juries may affect
adjudication in the federal as well as state systems.267 However, one would
expect more politically insulated federal judges to exercise greater authority
in limiting jury excesses, even when to do so would run counter to the
prevailing political winds.268 For that reason, a federal forum is preferable
when the primary source of bias is the jury.
Even absent a demonstration that nativism influences the state courts'
adjudication, there are reasons to ensure that foreign businesses have access
to a federal forum. As some of the Framers of the Constitution recognized,
the greater certainty and uniformity offered by a national court system, rather
than a multitude of state courts, may attract foreign capital to the United
States. Uncertainty and fear are exacerbated when xenophobia is prevalent.
The demonization of "Arab oil money," Japanese business, and Mexican
business by NAFTA opponents only can increase the need for assurances for
foreign business.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged that procedural
rules, including jurisdictional ones, may have an impact on international trade
and commerce. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which provides for
a waiver of the immunity enjoyed by a foreign sovereign because of its
commercial activity, is a prominent example.269 The Supreme Court, in
showing its willingness to enforce, forum selection clauses in contracts
involving foreign citizens, emphasized the economic benefits of such
264. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
265. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984), cert. granted (U.S. Apr. 24, 1984) (No. 82-1127). To the extent that these cases
involve xenophobia on the part ofjuries, the concern will be addressed infra text accompanying notes 266-
67. In these cases, however, judges are arguably not exercising the proper control over jury excesses.
266. See Jack L. Lahr, Bias and Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and Other
Technology Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 405 (1992); see, e.g., Leslie Helm, Jury Orders Nintendo to
Pay $208.3 Million in Patent Case, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1994, at D3 (quoting Nintendo general counsel:
"'This kind of outrageous verdict presents an image of bias against foreigners or large companies . '").
267. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 120; see, e.g., Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, 848
F.2d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1988) (addressing new trial motion based on closing argument to jury appealing
to passions and prejudice that referred to Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, who was not
involved in lawsuit); Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Legrand, No. C-88-1897-DLJ, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20225,,
at *22 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1992) (rejecting claim for new trial based on argument that "xenophobia
in plaintiffcounsel's closing arguments... prejudiced the jury"); Matherne v. Alexandria Maritime, Inc.,
No. 88-2261, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11565 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 1991) (denying new trial motion based
on appeals to xenophobia).
268. See, e.g., Gearhart v. Uniden Corp., 781 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1986) (instructing district court
not to allow plaintiff in closing argument to mention fact that defendant had foreign parent corporation:
"[W]e believe such repeated references to Far Eastern parent corporations and 'foreign goods' or 'foreign
products' could prejudicially appeal to xenophobia and the current United States-Japanese trade
imbalance." (citation omitted)). P
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988); see, e.g.,-Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607 (1992).
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mechanisms.27 Moreover, the Court has acknowledged the special burden
on foreign business of being forced to defend in a court in a distant locale
with a vastly different legal culture that is "foreign" to them in every sense
of the word.271
The uncertainty and burden are greater when the noncitizen business is
subject to the differences of the courts of fifty states, as opposed to the more
uniform characteristics of the federal system. Comfort is gained from the
knowledge that noncitizens may be subject to dispute resolution in a single
foreign system, as opposed to many foreign systems. Foreign business might
well be sensitive to the uncertainties wrought when subject to the variations
of fifty state court systems. Generally speaking, commercial enterprises desire
greater as opposed to less certainty in legal affairs. The availability of a
federal forum offers greater certainty and the perception of a forum preferable
to that of the states, thereby making the nation more attractive to foreign
capital.
Of course, the impact of eliminating access to the federal courts on
international trade is uncertain absent an actual experiment. The large
potential benefits of the U.S. market may outweigh concerns of foreign
business about judicial systems. Similarly, foreign business has continued to
conduct commercial activity in this country despite being subject to the
vagaries of the laws of the different states. Nonetheless, all other things being
equal, access to a federal forum should increase the attractiveness of the
United States to foreign business. To eliminate or to narrow alienage
jurisdiction therefore might result in adverse trade consequences.
The economic justifications for alienage jurisdiction in some ways are
currently stronger than at the time of the Constitutional Convention. The
increasingly global economy has resulted in a vast growth of foreign trade by
domestic business.272 Burgeoning commerce with Pacific Rim nations,
273
as well as the promise of increased trade with Canada and Mexico under the
270. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (enforcing forum selection
clause in contract between foreign corporation and U.S. consumer and emphasizing that "clause
establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion
about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and
expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise
would be devoted to deciding these motions"); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13
(1972) ("Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit
could be maintained in any jurisdiction .... The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade." (footnote
omitted)). The vagaries and uncertainties of the law of personal jurisdiction may well have contributed to
the increased reliance of private parties on forum selection clauses. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin
R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination under International Shoe,
28 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 769, 836 n.309 (1995); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A
Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1 (1993) (lamenting lack of certainty in American
jurisdiction law).
271. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987) (finding that,
because of unfairness of exercise of jurisdiction over Japanese defendant by California courts, exercise
violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
272. See generally LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULEs OF THE GAME IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLicY REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BusINEss (1992).
273. See Alan Tonelson, The Economics of NA TO, in NATO AT 40 96 (Ted Galen Carpenter ed.,
1990) (noting that, in 1980s, U.S. trade with East Asian and Pacific nations was surpassing that with
Western European nations).
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North America Free Trade Agreement,274 are examples of the strides being
made by the United States in increasing business between domestic entities
and foreign businesses. This, of course, is very different from the situation at
the time of the framing. The United States economy is not as fragile as it was
in 1787. Nonetheless, global economic interdependence means that the United
States cannot act without regard to the concerns of the rest of the world.
Moreover, the potential foreign relations implications of perceived unfair
treatment of foreign businesses in the state courts continues to be great.275
The tense, often delicately managed, trade negotiations that the United States
has had with some nations as the twentieth century comes to a close exemplify
the national concern with international trade.276 The xenophobic outburst,
as the rise in anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1980s suggests, may be greatest
at times with those nations with which the United States does considerable
commerce. Moreover, this antiforeign sentiment historically has been the most
virulent at the state level.
There is a related foreign relations concern as well. The United States is
concerned with its commercial activities in foreign markets as well as with
attracting foreign capital to its shores. To the extent that the United States
takes steps to promote the perception that foreign businesses are entitled to
procedural fairness in its court systems, other nations might be expected to
reciprocate. Thus, the perception of fair treatment of foreign business in the
United States should result in fairer treatment of this nation's businesses by
foreign nations.
E. The Advantages of a Federal Over a State Forum
This Article contends that federal courts are preferable to state courts for
the resolution of disputes involving noncitizens. As I have suggested, this is
difficult to verify empirically. Despite the lack of quantitative evidence, there
is significant qualitative evidence supporting the need for a more available
federal forum for noncitizens.
Burt Neuborne's classic article, The Myth of Parity,277 persuasively
argues that federal courts are superior to state courts in the adjudication of
constitutional claims.27 In reaching this conclusion, he compared the
"technical competence," "psychological mindset," and "insulation from
274. See Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296-456, 612-799, 33 I.L.M. 649-57, 663-64, 671-80 (1994).
275. Cf Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994) (calling for
more rigorous review of state regulation of foreign, as opposed to domestic, commerce, because different
interests are implicated by foreign commerce).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
277. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
278. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) ("The constitution has
presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control,
the regular administration of justice."); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question,
71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991) (contending that Constitution speaks to question of parity by guaranteeing
availability of final federal forum for review of constitutional questions); cf. Richard H. Fallon, The
Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,'1158-64 (1988) (describing "nationalist model"
of federal courts law with emphasis on supremacy of federal interests over state sovereignty).
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majoritarian principles" of the state and federal courts.279 In Neuborne's
view, all of these factors weigh in favor of a preference for federal over state
courts in the resolution of constitutional claims.2"' This section will consider
these factors in analyzing whether federal or state courts are better suited to
deciding alienage cases.
"Technical competence" is self-explanatory. A small elite core of federal
judges aided by first rate law clerks are preferable to state courts in deciding
difficult cases.2 ' Even assuming that the law applied to disputes involving
aliens is less complicated than modern constitutional law, the need for
competence is important. Such competence on the part of the federal courts
would be expected to inspire the confidence of foreign governments and
noncitizens generally, which the Framers of the Constitution thought necessary
for diplomatic and commercial purposes. Federal courts generally are more
selective when it comes to cases and judges, have a smaller caseload than
state court judges, and have more resources at their disposal. The federal
courts decide a number of cases with foreign policy ramifications and are
aware of the significant, often complex issues raised by such cases. Armed
with experience, federal courts should be expected to weigh the appropriate
interests in the typical alienage case and take steps to minimize foreign
relations consequences." 2 Indeed, this preference for allowing the federal
government to deal with matters implicating foreign relations was one of the
reasons for the Constitutional Convention.2"' The perception of foreign
governments and noncitizens that federal courts are more competent than state
courts is crucial to the decisions of foreign businesses and governments on
issues such as where to invest capital. 2"4
The "psychological mindset" of the federal courts is another salient
consideration. Neuborne identifies the tradition emphasizing quality work by
the federal judiciary, the "receptivity" to the decisions of the Supreme Court,
the "ivory tower syndrome" of being distant from "the pressures and
emotions" generated by constitutional cases, and the elite class backgrounds
of federal as opposed to state judges." 5
Devotion to high quality work286 is essential in dealing with complex
disputes that transcend state and national boundaries. Though perhaps less
important than in the constitutional realm, adherence to the dictates of the
279. Neuborne, supra note 277, at 1120-21.
280. Some have disputed Neuborne's conclusion in this regard. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 623-35 (1981); Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis
of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 213 (1983).
281. Neuborne, supra note 277, at 1121-22.
282. Cf Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-27 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (making similar point with respect to federal question cases).
283. See supra Part II.A (describing foreign relations concerns of Framers).
284. See supra note 68 (making similar point as justification for diversity jurisdiction); see also Part
IV.D (contending that alienage jurisdiction facilitates international trade).
285. Neubome, supra note 277, at 1124-26; see also POSNER, supra note 15, at 46 ("Whatever
the difficulty of drawing exact parallels, there is no doubt that the average conditions of employment in
the state judicial systems are inferior to those in the federal system.").
286. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 144 (observing that "[t]here is some indirect but interesting
evidence that the federal courts really are of somewhat higher quality than state courts").
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Supreme Court is relevant in alienage cases. The lower federal courts are
more likely to be familiar with Supreme Court decisions touching on foreign
relations matters and read into them the appropriate nuances. 217 One might
also surmise that constitutional protections accorded aliens, on which the
Supreme Court has the final word, are more likely to be honored by the
federal than the state courts.2"' Indeed, the state political processes, to which
the state court judges in many states are accountable, at various times have
been the harshest in terms of discrimination against noncitizens.2"9
Distance from the pressures and emotions of xenophobia is a distinct
benefit in alienage cases. As we have seen, antiforeign sentiment can be
passionate, strong, punitive, and sometimes even violent.2 0 Removing
judges as far as possible from the turmoil of any nativist outburst is a strong
advantage. Federal courts, of course, will not be unaware of such views. They
can, however, be expected to be less influenced by political antipathy toward
noncitizens than the state courts. Unlike their state counterparts, federal courts
are more likely to be "above the fray" than in its midst.
It is unclear how Neuborne's focus on the upper class elite background
of the federal judiciary fits in the alienage context. True, the federal judiciary
is an elite institution and a federal judge has much prestige. There also is a
link between antiforeign sentiment and social class, 291 a phenomenon
resulting at least in part from competition between the working class and new
immigrants in the labor market.292 Whether there is a class gap of any
significance between the state and federal judiciary is a different question. It
is not clear that the relative class differences between state and federal judges
would render one or the other less sympathetic to noncitizens.
A final factor, peculiar to foreign relations matters, favors federal over
state courts. Greater uniformity of decisions, one of the concerns of the
Framers of the Constitution in foreign relations matters,293 is more likely if
federal courts resolve matters involving 'aliens.2 94 True, there will be less
uniformity in light of the fact that alienage jurisdiction is concurrent rather
287. See also Mishkin, supra note 7, at 158 (making similar point in analyzing federal question
jurisdiction and emphasizing that "sympathetic handling of the available Supreme Court rulings" is
important in promoting uniformity and that lifetime tenured federal court judges "are more likely to give
full scope to any given Supreme Court decision, and particularly ones unpopular locally, than are their
state counterparts") (footnote omitted).
288. See TRIBE, supra note 142, § 16-23, at 1544-53 (analyzing Supreme Court cases dealing with
protection of aliens under Equal Protection Clause).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 254-57 (describing alien land laws passed by various
states); see, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that state university could not deny in-state
tuition status to certain noncitizens domiciled in state); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating
Texas law that prohibited undocumented children from attending public schools).
290. See supra Part IV.C.
291. See RITA J. SIMON & SUSAN H. ALEXANDER, THE AMBIVALENT WELCOME: PRINT MEDIA,
PUBLIC OPINION AND IMMIGRATION 40 (1993) (studying public opinion poll data to this effect).
292. For this reason, organized labor at various times in U.S. history has backed restrictionist
immigration measures. See generally GWENDOLYN MINK,' OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1986) (analyzing restrictionist positions of organized labor in
United States).
293. See supra Part II.A.
294. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (-I Wheat) 304, 347-48 (1816) (emphasizing that
Congress recognized "importance, and even necessity of nifurmity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon subjects within the purview of the constitution").
19961
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
than exclusive. Nonetheless, one, would expect greater uniformity when
federal courts have the power to decide some alienage cases than when such
cases are relegated exclusively to the states for decision.295
As mentioned previously, the fact that federal judges are more insulated
than state court judges from the political process is as important to the
resolution of alienage cases as it is to constitutional ones. Foreign citizens and
entities can draw great antipathy in the political process. This has sporadically
resulted in distinctively negative consequences for aliens. One fears that such
sentiment prevalent in the political process will influence a politically
accountable state court judge, though the degree of such influence admittedly
is difficult to measure.
F. Summary
This part has traced the modern justifications for alienage jurisdiction.
Political and commercial, international and domestic benefits accrue as a
result of allowing foreign citizens and business access to the national courts.
The next part of the Article builds on the idea that, as at the time of the
framing and as demonstrated by over two hundred years of experience, there
remains a need for alienage jurisdiction in the federal courts.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
This part of the Article studies the deficiencies with alienage jurisdiction
as it currently operates and some reforms that would allow it to better achieve
the stated goals. This part further responds to some possible criticisms and
mentions more far reaching possibilities for reform deserving of future study.
A. The Over- and Underinclusiveness of Alienage Jurisdiction
As previously examined, alienage jurisdiction is underinclusive in terms
of its stated purposes.296 Most importantly, the federal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over any dispute involving an alien, such as a suit
brought by one alien against another, despite the possible national
consequences if a state court is perceived to treat an alien unfairly.297 In
addition, as implemented by Congress, alienage jurisdiction protects only
certain noncitizens and only when the amount in controversy is in excess of
$50,000.298
At the same time, alienage jurisdiction is overinclusive. Not all aliens are
scorned in the United States at all times. Political refugees, for example, are
295. See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-27 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (making similar point in federal question context). However, the benefits of uniformity may
be limited to some extent by the fact that federal courts ordinarily apply state law in alienage cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 359-63.
296. See supra Part II.A.3.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
298. See supra Part III.
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revered in the American consciousness.299 Consequently, some aliens who
might not face potential bias in the state courts may avail themselves of a
federal forum for other reasons. In addition, antiforeign sentiment also may
vary depending on how "foreign" to dominant United States society the alien
is, a variable ignored by Article Im. For example, at least in the 1990s, there
may be more animosity toward Middle Eastern or Japanese citizens and
business associations, which involve persons with physical characteristics and
cultures different from those that predominate in the United States, than
toward citizens of the United Kingdom or Germany. Although the British
were the targets of the antiforeign animus of the late eighteenth century in the
United States, other so-called foreigners are today's pariahs. Article III, of
course, fails to make careful distinctions between aliens.
As its simultaneous under- and overinclusiveness demonstrates, alienage
jurisdiction is imperfect in light of the goals articulated for it. Problems
caused by the underinclusiveness of Article III, of course, are difficult to
avoid because Congress obviously cannot expand jurisdiction beyond that
permitted by Article III. The Constitution is overinclusive as well. Namely,
disputes involving all aliens, not just unpopular ones, may serve as the basis
for alienage jurisdiction. This bright line rule avoids transaction costs
associated with individual case specific determinations and may outweigh any
costs of overinclusiveness. Other sorts of overinclusiveness, however, may
warrant amendment of the implementing statute.3"
With this in mind, we should consider whether alienage jurisdiction
effectively serves its stated purposes and, if not, how its implementation may
be improved. This Article has argued that federal courts are preferable to state
courts in adjudicating disputes involving noncitizens. Even without definitive
empirical verification,01 perceptions in and of themselves are as important
in the alienage as in the diversity context.3 2 As we have seen, alienage
jurisdiction, at a minimum, offers the appearance of a more politically
insulated forum and provides noncitizens with one court system, not over
fifty, with which to deal in disputes. 3 Federal courts afford more certainty
and uniformity, thereby increasing the comfort level of those for whom
dispute resolution in the United States is foreign, mysterious, and
threatening.3 ' This may attract foreign companies to do business in the
United States. 05
Although federal judges structurally are more insulated from the political
process than their state counterparts, 3 the most likely place where bias may
299. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 1266 (1990).
300. See infra Part V.B (analyzing such possibilities).
301. See supra text accompanying note 220.
302. See supra Part II.
303. This is not true for all disputes involving noncitizens. The amount in controversy requirement
mandates that some claims by or against aliens be brought in the state courts. See supra text accompanying
notes 118-21.
304. See supra Part IV.D, E.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 269-71.
306. See supra text accompanying note 268. The degree of the insulation, however, has been
questioned. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 280, at 227-28.
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infiltrate the dispute resolution process is in the jury room where judges have
little control. 3" Federal juries, although pulled from a larger geographical
pool, have roughly the same qualifications as juries in state court.308 There
is little reason to believe that federal juries are less likely than state juries to
harbor antiforeign sentiment. To the contrary, state court jury pools in certain
localities may be less prone to bias against noncitizens than their federal
counterparts. 3° Let me explain.
Because a federal district generally covers a larger geographic area than
a local state court, federal juries frequently are drawn from a larger pool than
those in state court. A federal jury, therefore, may include perspective jurors
from many different local political subdivisions. On the other hand, a jury in
state court generally is pulled from a smaller geographical area, usually
involving a county or comparable political subdivision.
For example, the Northern District of California, based in San Francisco,
pulls jurors from fifteen counties, from San Francisco all the way up the
Pacific Coast to California's northern border with Oregon, including many
thinly populated rural areas. 10 In contrast, the California Superior Court,
in and for the County of San Francisco, selects jurors only from San
Francisco.311 The demographic differences between state and federal jury
pools in this instance are significant.312 There are a great many more
noncitizens and foreign businesses present in San Francisco than in some of
the relatively homogeneous counties from which the Northern District of
California pulls jurors.313 Immigrants and foreign businesses also tend to
307. See also Kramer, supra note 21, at 120 (making this observation in diversity context).
308. For example, juror qualifications in California are almost identical to the federal ones.
Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a) (Deering 1991 & Supp. 1995) (providing that jurors be citizens
18 years of age or older, be domiciliaries of state, be residents ofjurisdiction in which they are called to
serve, be familiar with English, not be convicted felons without restoration of civil rights, and not be
subject of conservatorship) with 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1988) (providing that jurors be citizens of United
States at least 18 years of age who have also resided in district for one year, who have proficiency in
English, who are not incapable of service due to mental or physical infirmity, and who are not charged
or convicted of felony absent restoration of civil rights).
309. Practitioners are well aware of differences between federal and state juries in a given locality.
See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSpECTIVEs § 7.04, at 565 (1986) (describing protracted litigation over personal jurisdiction in World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in which litigation was motivated by whether trial
would be before state or federal jury).
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(a) (1988) (providing that Northern District of California comprises
counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Del Norte, Humboldt, Lake, Marin, Mendecino, Monterey, Napa,
San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Sonoma); see also id. § 1865(b)(1)
(stating that juror must have "resided for a period of one year within judicial district").
311. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 197(a), 203(a)(4).
312. In some circumstances, it might be difficult to obtain an impartialjury in either system in light
of the prevalence of antiforeign sentiment among the general population.
To the extent that language ability might serve as the basis for striking jurors, this might have a
disparate impact on noncitizens, Who are more likely to speak a foreign language than citizens. See
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that peremptory challenges might be based on
language ability so long as not used as pretext for race).
313. Here is an example illustrating this demographic observation. According to the 1990 U.S.
Census, San Francisco has a population of about 53.6% whites (387,783 of 723,959) and 10.9% (79,039)
black, 0.48% (3456) Native American, 28.6% (207,155) Asian, 0.51% (3721) Pacific Islander, and 13.9%
(100,717) "Hispanic origin." CALIFORNIA CITIEs, TOWNS, & COUNTIES 1993, at 504 (Edith R. Horner
ed., 1993). (The numbers may overstate the white population because persons classified as white for
census purposes include people of Hispanic ancestry. See id. at vii.) In contrast, Humboldt County, also
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center in large urban centers, such as the San Francisco bay area.1 4 One
might expect urban jurors with more exposure to noncitizens, and perhaps a
more cosmopolitan world view, to be less biased against noncitizens than
those from rural, often more conservative, localities with a relatively smaller
noncitizen population.315 Consequently, one might guess that. a state court
jury composed of San Francisco urbanites would be less likely to be biased
toward noncitizens than a more homogeneous federal counterpart.
Of course, this is not necessarily the case. A noncitizen residing in a
thinly populated county with few aliens or naturalized citizens may desire
access to a federal forum. For example, trial in a state court in rural
Humboldt County in the Northern District of California might raise concerns
similar to those raised by decisions by all-white juries in racially charged
cases.3" 6 A broader, more heterogeneous federal jury pool, such as the
Northern District of California, may improve the possibility that the
noncitizen will receive a fair jury trial in this instance.
Situations similar to the federal/state jury pools in the courts sitting in San
Francisco might exist in other major metropolitan areas with large foreign
born populations, such as El Paso, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City.
A litigator representing a noncitizen in this situation would need to weigh,
among many other considerations, the benefits of a potentially less biased jury
in state court against the costs of a possibly more politically sensitive judge,
in deciding whether to opt for a federal forum.317
The point is that, because of the complexities of vastly different jury
pools available in state and federal courts in some locales, alienage
jurisdiction is not particularly well suited to remedying potential bias against
noncitizens. However, it is difficult to structure alienage jurisdiction to ensure
that it can only be exercised in instances in which the state court's impartiality
is suspect. Nevertheless, devices can be created to afford the option of a
in the Northern District of California, has a population of about 90.6% whites (107,881 of 119,118)
and 0.81% (960) black, 5.5% (6568) Native American, 1.8% (2144) Asian, 0.14% (171) Pacific Islander,
and 4.2% (4989) "Hispanic origin." See id. at 478.
314. See MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT 29 (1994) (stating that 76% of all immigrants went to six states California, New
York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois and that 93% of foreign born population lived in metropolitan
areas, compared to 73% of natives).
315. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Competition for scarce resources among
immigrants, lawful as well as unlawful, and minority citizens in major metropolitan areas may fuel -anti-
immigrant hostility. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Reaction of Black Americans to Immigration, in
IMMIGRATION RECONSIDERED 293, 297 (Virginia Yans-McLaughlin ed., 1990) (analyzing historical desire
of rank and file African Americans to limit immigration); Jack Miles, Blacks vs. Browns, THE ATLANTIC,
Oct. 1992, at 41 (noting hostility between African Americans and Latinos). Similarly, the limited
experience of persons in some localities with immigrants may result in little animosity toward them as a
group.
316. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 704 (1995) ("Few
statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice than this one: 'The
defendant was tried by an all-white jury.'").
317. However, in an alien friendly jurisdiction, antiforeign political pressures on a state courtjudge
may be minimal.
Note here that I am assuming that litigators shop for the optimal forum to bring suit. Although forum
shopping is often frowned upon by the courts, litigators, within the bounds of the applicable law,
unquestionably shop for the forum most favorable to their case. See Friedrich, K. Juenger, Forum
Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TuL. L. REV. 553, 554 (1989).
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federal forum to the alien and to stop a domestic litigant from invoking the
alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts. This and a variety of suggested
reforms will be analyzed in the following sections.
B. Specific Changes
As we have seen, alienage jurisdiction is a less than perfect way of
vindicating its stated goals. In essence, though offering more uniformity and
certainty, the federal courts may not be all that different from their state
counterparts with respect to the treatment of aliens. Just as xenophobia may
influence the political processes generally, it jeopardizes the decisions of
juries, both federal and state. Consequently, if changes to alienage jurisdiction
(and to the adjudication of claims involving aliens) are to be considered, they
should be aimed at improving the ability of noncitizens to have access to a
forum free from anti-alien sentiment. This calls not for further restrictions on
alienage jurisdiction but for a modest expansion and for devices that preserve
the ability of noncitizens to select a state or federal forum.
1. A Separate Alienage Statute
One of the problems that we saw in the evolution of alienage jurisdiction
was that Congress made changes to the general diversity statute without
consideration of the impact on alienage cases. To avoid this unnecessary
problem, an important first step would be to remove alienage jurisdiction from
the auspices of the general diversity statute and enact a separate and
independent provision dealing exclusively with alienage cases. Such a change
would result in several concrete benefits.
A separate alienage statute would highlight the independent significance
of such jurisdiction and emphasize that it serves distinctly different purposes
than those of diversity jurisdiction. Discrimination against noncitizens,
perceived and real, by state courts has more significant adverse impacts on
national interests than simple discrimination against out-of-staters, namely
foreign relations and international trade concerns.
Moreover, although there is a wealth of history documenting xenophobia
in the United States, bias against citizens of other states has a much sparser
history. The most memorable blanket resentment against nonresidents may be
regional in nature, such as Northerners' antipathy for Southerners and vice
versa in the Civil War era. Any remaining animosity fails to rise to the level
of antiforeign sentiment present in the United States. This country simply has
not experienced the history of discrimination, lawful and not, against out-of-
staters that it has with respect to noncitizens.
Because of their distinctive histories, alienage and diversity cases in
certain instances should be subject to different rules that separate statutory
provisions would facilitate. A new alienage statute would allow disputes
involving aliens to be dealt with in a precise manner crafted to the specific
needs and purposes of alienage jurisdiction. Such rules would have no impact
on diversity cases generally, and amendments could be made to the diversity




Acting to protect national interests in this way would not be
unprecedented. Congress, for example, in an analogous setting enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?" and removed actions brought against
foreign nations from the auspices of section 1332. "Congress passed the...
Act in order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic
pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to 'assur[e] litigants
that.., decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process.'"'" By doing the same for alienage jurisdiction,
Congress could address many problems that have unintentionally resulted from
treating diversity and alienage as one and the same and could improve
alienage jurisdiction.
Clarification, codification, and rationalization of existing law could be
achieved through the simple expedient of separating alienage from diversity
jurisdiction. Separate treatment would tend to minimize the often unintended,
unconsidered consequences on alienage cases that result when Congress acts
to reduce the flow of diversity cases into federal court.32° Improvements
could be brought about without changing the substance of the current alienage
law in major ways and at the same time they could limit unintended
consequences resulting from the amendment of the general diversity statute.
Similarly, a new statute focusing on alienage cases could include the part of
the current diversity statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4)) governing civil actions
filed by foreign states as plaintiffs.
To ensure the vindication of the purposes of Article III's grant of alienage
jurisdiction in today's world, however, some substantive changes warrant
consideration. These will be outlined in the next few sections.
2. Minimal Diversity in Alienage Cases
As we previously saw, a variation of the rule of complete diversity
requirement applies to alienage cases.32' Subsection 1332(a)(3), which
provides that aliens may be additional parties to lawsuits between citizens of
different states, fails to authorize jurisdiction in a suit brought by an alien
against a citizen and another alien.3  Under this rule, a Virginian and an
English citizen might sue a Texan and a Mexican citizen in federal court;
however, an English citizen alone could not sue the same defendants.3"' This
318. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1331,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
319. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-05).
320. See, e.g., supra Part IlI.A (discussing these consequences).
321. See supra text accompanying note 158.
322. See Israel Aircraft Indus. v. Sanwa Business Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1994);
Depex Reina 9 Partnership v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 897 F.2d 461, 465 (10th Cir. 1990);
Faysound, Ltd. v. United Coconut Chems. 878 F.2d 290, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1989).
323. See, e.g., Eze v. Yellow Cab Co., 782 F.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(holding that under § 1332 Nigerian plaintiffs could not sue Virginian corporation and citizen of Ghana);
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1151 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that citizens of
Singapore could not sue Liberian corporation with principal place of business in New Jersey); Ed & Fred,
Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that citizen
1996]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
scenario is distinctly different than an alien suing another alien, which raises
serious constitutional concerns.
There is a need for a minimal diversity requirement in alienage cases
because the mere fact that noncitizens are on both sides of a dispute does not
necessarily mean that anti-alien bias will "cancel" itself out. Consider, for
example, a dispute between U.S. and English plaintiffs and Egyptian
defendants. Because noncitizens are on both sides of the dispute and a citizen
is on only one side, the case would be ineligible for alienage jurisdiction
under subsection 1332(a)(3). Nonetheless, a strong argument could be made
that the Egyptian defendants in the modern United States might be subject to
biases and prejudices to which state courts in some circumstances may be
particularly susceptible.32a Similar examples undoubtedly exist.
The complete alienage requirement further fails to appreciate fully the
foreign relations implications raised if an alien is a party to a lawsuit. A
foreign government might believe that its citizen was unfairly treated,
regardless of whether a citizen of another nation was a party to the lawsuit.
Foreign governments are concerned about the fairness of the treatment of their
citizens, not whether there happened to be a citizen of some other country as
a party. There is no reason to believe in the above hypothetical that the fact
that one plaintiff was English would tend to minimize any bias toward the
Egyptian defendants. There is no indication that the government of Egypt
would be satisfied that its citizens received fair treatment simply because one
plaintiff was English. Whatever the merits of requiring complete diversity in
cases involving citizens of different states, the possible foreign policy
ramifications distinguish alienage from ordinary diversity cases.
In light of the significant federal concerns at stake, minimal diversity,
which is all that is required by Article III, is entirely appropriate in
alienage cases.32 Consequently, Congress has the authority to pass
legislation allowing a noncitizen to sue a citizen and another noncitizen or a
noncitizen and citizen to sue a noncitizen.
For similar reasons, changes to the removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441),
which bars removal of any nonfederal question case "only if none of the...
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought,"327
might be warranted. At one time, Congress allowed an alien or citizen of a
of Netherlands Antilles could not sue citizen of Bermuda and citizen of Massachusetts).
324. Nor does an individualized analysis appear feasible. Before 1948, "Congress required a
showing of bias as a justification for removing diversity cases to federal court, but the 1948 revision of
title 28 removed all references to such bias, finding them inappropriate and noting that the removal-for-bias
provisions were seldom employed." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note
15, at 40.
325. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 n.1 (1989); Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 n. 18 (1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523, 530 (1967); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988) (interpleader statute requiring minimal diversity
between claimants).
326. Others have so claimed. See Freer, supra note 108, at 474-75; Kramer, supra note 21, at 122;
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 40; Rowe, supra note 20, at
1011-12. Congress, of course, could not authorize alienage jurisdiction to allow an alien to sue another
alien in federal court, which would run afoul of Article I. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
Minimal diversity jurisdiction, perhaps better denominated minimal alienage jurisdiction, refers here only
to constitutional configurations of jurisdiction.
327. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
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state other than the forum state to remove a case from state to federal court
even though a citizen of the forum state was a codefendant.2 Such a
removal option for noncitizens makes sense today.329 There is no persuasive
reason for denying an alien defendant access to the federal courts simply
because another defendant is a citizen of the forum state. The untenable theory
for the current rule apparently is that bias against the. noncitizen will be
diminished by the fact that a state citizen is a codefendant. It is just as
possible (and perhaps more likely), however, that the noncitizen defendant
will suffer while the citizen defendant will be favored. 30 Relaxing the
removal requirements in this way would guarantee noncitizens a federal
option.33'
3. Reconsideration of the Citizenship Rules for Foreign Corporations
We previously reviewed the amendments to the diversity statute dealing
with corporate citizenship that were passed without consideration of the
special problems of foreign corporations. 32 There is no necessity for
identical treatment of foreign and domestic corporations. As we saw, the
Framers wanted to ensure a national forum to noncitizens in order to attract
foreign business. The history of xenophobia toward foreign business carries
forward to modern times.33 Because foreign corporations may be subject
to bias even if their principal place of business is in the United States, the
statute should treat them as noncitizens.334 This would be objectionable to
some because it would treat foreign corporations differently from domestic
ones.335 However, differential treatment is justified by the mere fact that a
corporation formed under the laws of a foreign country might be subject to
hostility in the state courts.
For analogous reasons, unincorporated associations, such as a partnership,
organized under the laws of another nation might be subject to the minimal
diversity requirement or treated as foreign corporations. Currently, the general
diversity statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, requires -that the
328. See Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 306 (repealed 1911).
329. This would not be the first time that an amendment to the removal statute would benefit aliens.
The 1948 Judicial Code conditioned removal on the absence of any citizens of the state as defendants, a
condition that excludes aliens. Previously, removal was conditioned on the absence of residents, including
aliens, from the civil suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This result, however, may
not have been intended. See 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3723, at 330.
330. See Currie, supra note 104, at 18-19.
331. One empirical study found that 16.6% of a sample of removal cases involved foreign
nationals, including individuals, corporations, and countries. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of
Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
369, 391 (1992). This suggests that some noncitizens prefer the federal courts over the state courts.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 105-114.
333. See supra Part IV.D.1.
334. See Eshak, supra note 108, at 584-87; Miller, supra note 108, at 1475-78; see also Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. Chameleon Fin. Co., No. 94-C773, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1991 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 16, 1995) (noting that international relations concerns of Framers would be thwarted by §
1332(c), which as applied barred French bank from suing U.S. company and its wholly owned subsidiary
that operated in Illinois but was incorporated in Netherlands).
335. I do not advocate here a statute that would treat a domestic corporation with a principal place
of business in a foreign country as a foreign corporation.
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citizenship of every member of an unincorporated association be considered
for jurisdictional purposes. 36 Allowing alienage jurisdiction even when a
United States citizen might be a partner or member of an unincorporated
association is justified by the simple fact that a foreign citizen who is a
member may subject the entire entity to discrimination. Alternatively, the
foreign party may be singled out for unfair treatment.
4. Reconsideration of the Amount in Controversy Requirements
As we saw previously, the amount in controversy requirement in the
general diversity statute has been slowly but surely increasing over time. The
requirement should be reconsidered in alienage cases for several reasons.
Some of the most vulnerable noncitizens, such as undocumented aliens,
may rarely be involved in disputes with a monetary value in excess of
$50,0002" The 1990s, particularly in some high immigration states, saw
great antipathy for "illegal aliens." 338 Unlike diversity cases, alienage cases
raise the potential for foreign entanglements that might injure the nation as a
whole. Bias against noncitizens and potential foreign relations consequences
if noncitizens are perceived as having been treated unfairly exist whether or
not a dispute satisfies the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement. In
combination, these factors differentiate alienage cases from the run of the mill
diversity case.
Elimination of the amount in controversy requirement would not be
unprecedented when foreign relations are implicated. Congress, for example,
has not imposed a monetary requirement on cases against foreign states under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 39 (though actions brought by foreign
states as plaintiffs are subject to the $50,000 requirement). 34° Nor does the
Alien Tort Claims Act, which allows for suit against foreign states, have an
amount in controversy requirement.3 1 Although the federal interests are not
as strong in cases involving aliens as they are in actions involving foreign
states, the potential foreign policy ramifications are much greater than in the
336. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (partnership); United Steelworkers v.
R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965) (labor union). In reaching this conclusion most recently, the
Court refused to adhere to Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), in which it had treated
an unincorporated Puerto Rican business association as a corporation for diversity purposes. See Carden,
494 U.S. at 189-92.
An alternative might be to treat a foreign partnership and any other unincorporated association as
a corporation. This presumably would require a statutory amendment allowing these entities to be treated
similarly to foreign corporations for jurisdictional purposes. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITuTE, supra note
165, § 1301(b)(2).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86 (discussing this group).
338. California's Proposition 187, an initiative that if implemented would preclude undocumented
persons from eligibility for most public benefits and services, including a public education, is a most
prominent example. See supra note 186 (citing authorities analyzing initiative).
339. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612 ("lTihe jurisdiction in district courts in cases against
foreign states [under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] is to be without regard to amount in
controversy. This is intended to encourage the bringing of actions against foreign states in Federal
courts.").
340. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).




Elimination of the amount in controversy requirement, however, conflicts
with the trend of increasing the amount in controversy requirement in the
general diversity statute.342 Nonetheless, an examination of the efficacy of
the requirement exclusively for alienage cases is worthy of study. Because of
the differences between alienage and diversity jurisdiction, there are strong
arguments to be made for increasing the amount in controversy requirement
in alienage cases at a slower rate than in diversity cases, maintaining the
status quo as the amount increases in diversity cases, or perhaps reducing or
abolishing the requirement in alienage cases.
5. Elimination of the Provision Deeming Certain Lawful Permanent
Residents to be Citizens of a State
I previously discussed in detail the shortcomings of the 1988 amendment
to section 1332 that deems lawful permanent residents to be citizens of
states.343 In light of those flaws, Congress should consider repeal of this
amendment.
To recapitulate briefly, a lawful permanent resident may fear bias if
forced to litigate in the state courts. Locked out of the political system that
controls the state judicial apparatus, this noncitizen should have access to a
more politically insulated federal court. Combining with the bias, potential
foreign policy ramifications exist if a lawful permanent resident is mistreated
by the state courts. This is true even though the potential is not as great as
when other types of noncitizens are mistreated.
Besides inappropriately limiting aliens' access to federal courts, the 1988
amendment on its face allows noncitizens to sue noncitizens in the federal
courts, a result of dubious constitutionality.3" To avoid this constitutional
complication, Congress should eliminate the language. At a minimum, the
implications of this curious provision deserve more serious consideration than
Congress gave it.
For similar reasons, Congress might consider addressing the problems of
dual citizenship in an alienage statute. I previously analyzed how the current
general diversity statute makes no provision for dual citizenship, thereby
resulting in considerable litigation. 45 A clear statutory rule for dual citizens
would avoid such unnecessary uncertainty. Dual citizens, who may be subject
to bias, should be able to invoke the alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Even though the potential for bias may be less than it is for other aliens, there
is the possibility that another nation might take offense if it believes that one
of its citizens - whether or not a United States citizen - has received shabby
treatment by the state courts. Because the United States has softened its
position on dual citizenship, 3" there will probably be more dual citizens in
the future, thus increasing the likelihood that this problem will arise and
p
342. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
343. See supra Part 1II.A.2.
344. See supra text accompanying note 132.
345. See supra Part II.A.2.
346. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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increasing the need for congressional consideration of the issue.
6. Limiting Alienage Jurisdiction
For those enamored with limiting federal jurisdiction, a few proposals
might be particularly appealing. Efforts could be made to limit the invocation
of alienage jurisdiction to aliens, that is, those parties who might fear
legitimate prejudice due to the fact that they are aliens. Consistent with the
perennial proposal made in diversity cases to bar in-state plaintiffs from
bringing diversity cases in federal court,"47 United States citizens (unless of
dual citizenship), regardless of their state of citizenship, could be barred from
filing alienage cases in the federal courts.
Any United States citizen (unless of dual nationality), regardless of state
citizenship, should be precluded from removing an alienage case from state
to federal court. Currently, if the United States citizen is a citizen of the state
in which the case is filed, it would not be removable. 48 However, if a
defendant is a citizen of a state other than that in which the action is filed, it
would be.349 To prevent a United States citizen from removing such a case,
Congress could bar citizens from removing cases based on alienage
jurisdiction. The foreign policy concerns in cases in which a noncitizen
decides to sue in state court (and thus apparently is unconcerned with bias in
that system, at least as compared to the federal court) are less of a concern
than if the noncitizen is forced to resort to that forum.
In contrast, a noncitizen should have the option of choosing a federal
forum when a case is brought against her. This effectively would remove the
current ability of United States citizens to invoke alienage jurisdiction for
strategic reasons either by filing in federal court or defeating a noncitizen's
forum choice by removing a case from state to federal court. It would allow
the noncitizen to select a state or federal forum depending on local conditions
and concerns.? Obviously, the alien also could opt for a federal forum for
other reasons, which is a cost to this approach.
Because roughly two-thirds of alienage cases are brought against
noncitizens,351 barring U.S. citizens from invoking alienage jurisdiction
might limit the impact of the relaxation of requirements called for by some of
the other proposals articulated in this Article. Note that this alternative
addresses only the concern with possible bias against noncitizens underlying
alienage jurisdiction and runs the risk that state courts, even when selected by
aliens, could rule in ways that impinge upon foreign relations. In addition, the
state courts simply are not as competent as their federal counterparts in
dealing with matters that touch upon foreign relations. However, the fact that
a foreign party selected a state over a federal forum would tend to minimize
the potential foreign relations consequences of any adverse judgment.
347. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIrrEE, supra note 15, at 42.
348. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
349. See id.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 308-17 (recognizing possibility of demographic differences
in state and federal jury pools that might impact bias against noncitizens).




Some of these proposals are contrary to the consistent trend toward
narrowing diversity jurisdiction. Consequently, the suggested reforms are
likely to meet the wrath of diversity abolitionists. As this Article has
emphasized, however, deviation from the norm of jurisdictional constriction
is justified in alienage cases. Unlike the simple bias against the citizens of
other states, there is stronger evidence of bias against foreigners from the days
of the framing of the Constitution to modern times.35 Foreign relations
concerns combine with this discriminatory potential to offer support for more
protective treatment of aliens.
One prominent observer desiring to winnow the diversity docket has
proposed limiting many categories of noncitizens from utilizing alienage
jurisdiction.353 Such wholesale limitations on alienage jurisdiction, however,
underestimate the benefits of alienage jurisdiction. Foreign entanglements may
result when an alien domiciled in the United States is involved in a dispute,
even if those ramifications may be of lesser magnitude than those with respect
to other categories of aliens.354 In any event, the narrowing of alienage
jurisdiction would do little to reduce the federal judicial caseload. 55 In other
words, the marginal benefits of retaining alienage jurisdiction outweigh the
marginal costs.
One might respond that although the Framers authorized Congress to
provide for alienage jurisdiction, there is no current, need for it - an
argument that this Article attempts to rebut. Unlike the young, politically and
economically weak nation that existed at the time of the framing, the United
States has become one of the strongest nations in the world. Consequently,
according to this argument, there is no need for great concern about the
offense that foreign governments might take at the perceived mistreatment of
their citizens. This is a view of foreign relations that cannot be rebutted in this
Article. Suffice it to say that the United States still seeks to avoid foreign
disputes and, particularly in recent years, has sought to promote international
trade. To ensure its central place in the new world order requires efforts to
ensure that foreign nationals receive the fairest treatment available in the
adjudication of disputes.
Another objection from a completely different perspective may be that my
incremental proposals to improve the implementation of alienage jurisdiction
fail to go far enough. For example, racism arguably is a significantly greater
social ill than bias against noncitizens, especially in the state courts, and all
racial minorities therefore should be able to have access to the federal courts.
352. See supra Part IV.C.
353. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 122 (arguing that Congress should amend statute to bar all
noncitizens domiciled in United States, including refugees, amnestied aliens, aliens applying for permanent
resident status, and undocumented aliens, from being treated as aliens for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction); see also FCSC, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 22, at 456 (making similar observations)
(Professor Kramer served as reporter for subcommittee that issued this report).
354. See supra Part IV.B (reviewing various types of noncitizens and suggesting that potential for
bias and negative foreign policy impacts due to perceptions of unfairness exist).
355. See supra note 19 (compiling statistics showing that alienage cases comprise relatively small
part of total number of diversity cases and even smaller proportion of federal judicial caseload).
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The Framers of the Constitution, however, failed to address expressly such
discrimination in Article I. By constitutional necessity, the proposals made
here are as underinclusive as Article I is with respect to discrimination other
than that toward aliens." 6 This is not to suggest that Congress, in exercising
its powers to ensure equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment, would be barred from passing legislation allowing racial and
other minorities to bring cases in federal court. 7
Similarly, naturalized citizens, especially those of certain national origin
groups, may be just as subject to bias as aliens. Both groups, because of
color, accent, and possibly other characteristics, may be perceived as foreign
and subject to discrimination. Under current law, as well as under my
suggestions, however, naturalized citizens (as long as not dual citizens) are
ineligible for alienage jurisdiction. Any inequality of treatment between
naturalized citizens and unnaturalized aliens stems from Article III and other
constitutional provisions, which make important distinctions between the rights
of citizens and aliens. Moreover, national origin minorities who are
naturalized citizens, unlike noncitizens, have access to the political process in
which they may attempt to combat bias in the state judiciaryY This, at
least in theory, places them in a very different position than unnaturalized
aliens.
D. Alternatives for Study
A number of possibilities for improving the treatment of aliens in both
state and federal courts are worthy of exploration. Federal courts could be
instructed to fashion uniquely federal common law in alienage cases. 59
Although Erie Railroad v. Tompkins360 held that federal courts sitting in
diversity must apply the forum state's law, the case appears to rest on an
356. As Charles Alan Wright has observed,
[Wuries may regrettably, be subject to many kinds of prejudice. Race, religion, appearance,
wealth, city as against country, home town as against another part of the state - all these are
factors that may sway a jury. If litigants subject to any or all of these prejudices must take
their chances with a state court, it is hard to defend a provision of having a federal forum that
exists to protect a person against such prejudice as may still be felt merely because the litigant
is a citizen of another state.
WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 23, at 148.
357. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Besides relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress might be able to enact a law allowing federal jurisdiction over claims involving racial and ethnic
minorities, or only to aliens of color, under a theory of protective jurisdiction. See BATOR ET AL., supra
note 13, at 983-89; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30
UCLA L. REv. 542 (1983).
358. Of course, as is true for any minority group, political change may be difficult and judicial
protection may be warranted. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minoriiies, and
which may call for a more searching judicial inquiry. .. ").
359. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (noting that Framers of Constitution appear not to
have addressed this question).
360. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act,361 which could be amended to
allow for federal common law to govern alienage cases. Because foreign
relations is the exclusive dominion of the federal government, and may be a
legitimate province of federal common law,362 such a statute would avoid
the possible constitutional impediments that some contend exist in the diversity
context. However, it runs contrary to the tradition of treating alienage and
diversity cases in a similar way for choice of law purposes. 363
As suggested by the burgeoning literature on the subject, efforts could be
made to diversify juries in an attempt to ensure fair treatment for
noncitizens.'" One difficulty faced by noncitizens that is different from that
faced by other minority groups is that noncitizens are wholly excluded from
serving on juries, thereby making it impossible to improve their
representation.365
Still, some national origin groups, especially those comprised of a
significant portion of immigrants and naturalized citizens, may be less likely
than other citizens to harbor anti-alien views. Improving the representation of
these groups on juries may limit the bias against aliens. This consideration
warrants further investigation, in no small part because it is not entirely clear
that citizens of certain national origin groups in fact will be less susceptible
to nativist views.
366
A very different possibility relating to juries calls for the exploration of
whether the states should preclude jury trials in alienage cases. The Seventh
361. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988); see Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946). But see supra note 78 (citing
authorities disputing this interpretation of Rules of Decision Act).
362. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-27 (1964); see also
Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1024, 1042-68 (1967) (analyzing federal common law relating to foreign relations).
363. For the period between Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) and Erie, the lower federal
courts appeared to follow the same rule in diversity cases and alienage cases - applying state statutes, see,
e.g., Zeiger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F. 348, 349-52 (W.D. Pa. 1907), and federal general common
law, see, e.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Camera, 52 F.2d 47, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1931); Jones v.
Shapora, 57 F. 457, 460-63 (5th Cir. 1893); Elder v. Whitesides, 72 F. 724, 725-26 (E.D. La. 1895).
After Erie, the courts generally have applied state law to alienage cases. See Harold G. Maier, The Bases
and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133,
135 (1971).
364. See, e.g., Sherri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1695-1700 (1985); Nancy J. King, RacialJurymandering: Canceror Cure?A Contemporary Review
of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 707, 719-29 (1993); Juan F. Perea,
Hernandez v. New York.- Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1, 47-51
(1992); Ramirez, supra note 40, at 802-17.
365. One might argue that noncitizens should be entitled to serve on juries, or perhaps that a
revival of mixed juries is in order in alienage cases. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48 (discussing
mixed juries). These types of proposals, however, are contrary to the traditional link in the United States
between political participation and jury service. See generally Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as
Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995) (arguing that jury service is
political right not protected by Equal Protection Clause).
366. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino .Community
in the Tweny-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 67-72 (1995) (analyzing various divisions in Latino
community based on immigration status). For example, it is not necessarily the case that a Mexican lawful
permanent resident can be impartial in a dispute between a U.S. citizen, with whom he may share some
affinity, and a Mexican business. Nor is it clear that the same alien would not harbor antiforeign views
against a Japanese or Middle Eastern business.
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Amendment has not been applied to the states, 67 though almost all states
have constitutional provisions mandating jury trials in certain civil actions.
368
Therefore, state courts, unlike federal courts, are free to experiment. 369 This
possibility necessarily is premised on the idea that state court judges are less
likely than juries to be biased against aliens, which is not clearly the case.
Nonetheless, bench trials by the states in alienage cases are worthy of further
study and might lessen the need for alienage jurisdiction in the federal courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the justifications offered by the Framers of the
Constitution for alienage jurisdiction and concluded that those justifications,
buttressed by experience, weigh heavily in favor of its retention and indeed
a possible expansion. Even assuming that the ever growing limitations on
diversity cases are necessary and justifiable, alienage cases stand on different
footing. Recurring xenophobia in the United States, the potential commercial
consequences of any appearances of partiality in a domestic adjudicatory
system in an era of an increasingly global economy, and potential foreign
relations ramifications, all militate in favor of the availability of a national
forum for aliens.
Alienage jurisdiction, however, is at best an imperfect tool for ensuring
the availability of an impartial forum for noncitizens. A number of
improvements to further the Framers' goals in providing for alienage
jurisdiction are needed. Modest changes could bring forth great improvements
that would clarify and improve the law and satisfy the goals of the Framers.
Such changes, however, first require a fundamental break with the past,
namely that Congress devote attention to the special problems associated with
alienage jurisdiction.
367. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 218-23 (1916).
368. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7, at 507 (2d ed. 1993). In the
alternative, states might bar the disclosure to the jury of the citizenship status of litigants. This might tend
to limit prejudice against noncitizens, though the potential for adverse foreign policy consequences
resulting from adjudication of the case in a state forum might remain. One problem is that a jury might
be able to infer that a party is an alien by physical appearance, accent, or some other indicator. Similarly,
it is often evident, by the name of the business for example, that a business is foreign owned.
369. The Seventh Amendment appears to mandate a trial by jury in civil cases in which aliens are
parties because such actions were tried by juries at the time of the constitutional framing. In contrast,
actions against foreign states were not tried by juries because of the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Consequently, the Seventh Amendment does not preclude the congressional decision that actions
brought against foreign nations are not tried by juries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
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